Moral Property Rights in Bargaining with Infeasible Claims

Simon Gächter and Arno Riedl

Management Science, 2005, vol. 51, issue 2, 249-263

Abstract: In many business transactions, labor-management relations, international conflicts, and welfare-state reforms, bargainers hold strong entitlements that are often generated by claims that are not feasible anymore. These entitlements seem to shape negotiation behavior considerably. By using the novel setup of a Übargaining with claimsÝ experiment, we provide new systematic evidence tracking the influence of entitlements and obligations through the whole bargaining process. We find strong entitlement effects that shape opening offers, bargaining duration, concessions, and (dis)agreements. We argue that entitlements constitute a Ümoral property rightÝ that is influential independent of negotiators' legal property rights.

Keywords: moral property rights; entitlements; fairness judgments; bargaining with claims; self-serving bias; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (197)

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Working Paper: Moral Property Rights in Bargaining with Infeasible Claims (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:51:y:2005:i:2:p:249-263

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