Moral Property Rights in Bargaining with Infeasible Claims

Simon Gächter and Arno Riedl

No 03-055/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: In many business transactions, in labor-management relations, in internationalconflicts, and welfare state reforms bargainers hold strong entitlements that are oftengenerated by claims that are not feasible any more. These entitlements seem to considerablyshape negotiation behavior. By using the novel setup of a 'bargaining with claims' experimentwe provide new systematic evidence tracking the influence of entitlements and obligationsthrough the whole bargaining process. We find strong entitlement effects that shape openingoffers, bargaining duration, concessions and reached (dis-)agreements. We argue thatentitlements constitute a 'moral property right' that is influential independent ofnegotiators' legal property rights.

Keywords: Moral property rights; fairness judgments; bargaining with claims; self-serving bias (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A12 C78 C92 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-06-18
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Moral Property Rights in Bargaining with Infeasible Claims (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20030055

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