Performance Appraisals and the Impact of Forced Distribution--An Experimental Investigation

Johannes Berger (), Christine Harbring () and Dirk Sliwka
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Johannes Berger: University of Cologne, 50931 Cologne, Germany
Christine Harbring: RWTH Aachen University, 52056 Aachen, Germany; and IZA-Institute for the Study of Labor, 53113 Bonn, Germany

Management Science, 2013, vol. 59, issue 1, 54-68

Abstract: A real-effort experiment is investigated in which supervisors have to rate the performance of individual workers who in turn receive a bonus payment based on these ratings. We compare a baseline treatment in which supervisors are not restricted in their rating behavior to a forced distribution system in which they have to assign differentiated grades. We find that productivity is significantly higher under a forced distribution by about 6% to 12%. However, the productivity effects are less clear cut when participants have prior experience with the baseline condition. Moreover, a forced distribution becomes detrimental when workers have access to a simple option to sabotage each other. This paper was accepted by Peter Wakker, decision analysis.

Keywords: performance measurement; forced distribution; forced ranking; motivation; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (55)

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1120.1624 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Performance Appraisals and the Impact of Forced Distribution: An Experimental Investigation (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:59:y:2013:i:1:p:54-68

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