Performance Appraisals and the Impact of Forced Distribution: An Experimental Investigation

Johannes Berger (), Christine Harbring () and Dirk Sliwka
Additional contact information
Johannes Berger: University of Cologne
Christine Harbring: RWTH Aachen University

No 5020, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: A real effort experiment is investigated in which supervisors have to rate the performance of individual workers who in turn receive a bonus payment based on these ratings. We compare a baseline treatment in which supervisors were not restricted in their rating behavior to a forced distribution system in which they had to assign differentiated grades. We find that productivity was significantly higher under a forced distribution by about 8%. But also in the absence of forced distribution, deliberate differentiation positively affected output in subsequent work periods.

Keywords: motivation; performance measurement; experiment; forced distribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D83 J33 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46 pages
Date: 2010-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published - published in: Management Science, 2013, 59 (1), 54-68

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Related works:
Journal Article: Performance Appraisals and the Impact of Forced Distribution--An Experimental Investigation (2013)
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