Incomplete punishment networks in public goods games: experimental evidence

Andreas Leibbrandt, Abhijit Ramalingam, Lauri Sääksvuori and James Walker

Experimental Economics, 2015, vol. 18, issue 1, 15-37

Abstract: Abundant evidence suggests that high levels of contributions to public goods can be sustained through self-governed monitoring and sanctioning. This experimental study investigates the effectiveness of decentralized sanctioning institutions in alternative punishment networks. Our results show that the structure of punishment network significantly affects allocations to the public good. In addition, we observe that network configurations are more important than punishment capacities for the levels of public good provision, imposed sanctions and economic efficiency. Lastly, we show that targeted revenge is a major driver of anti-social punishment. Copyright The Author(s) 2015

Keywords: Public goods experiment; Punishment; Cooperation; Networks; C72; C91; C92; D72; D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10683-014-9402-3 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Incomplete Punishment Networks in Public Goods Games: Experimental Evidence (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:expeco:v:18:y:2015:i:1:p:15-37

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/10683/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10683-014-9402-3

Access Statistics for this article

Experimental Economics is currently edited by David J. Cooper, Lata Gangadharan and Charles N. Noussair

More articles in Experimental Economics from Springer, Economic Science Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().