Incomplete Punishment Networks in Public Goods Games: Experimental Evidence

Andreas Leibbrandt, Abhijit Ramalingam, Lauri Sääksvuori and James Walker

No 13-09, Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) from School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.

Abstract: Abundant evidence suggests that high levels of contributions to public goods can be sustained through self-governed monitoring and sanctions. This experimental study investigates the effectiveness of decentralized sanctioning institutions in alternative punishment networks. Our results show that the structure of punishment network significantly affects allocations to the public good. In addition, we observe that network configurations are more important than punishment capacities for the levels of public good provision, imposed sanctions and economic efficiency. We show that targeted revenge is a major driver of anti-social punishment.

Keywords: public goods experiment; punishment; cooperation; networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 C92 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Journal Article: Incomplete punishment networks in public goods games: experimental evidence (2015)
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