How Robust is Laboratory Gift Exchange?

Gary Charness, Guillaume Frechette () and John Kagel

Experimental Economics, 2004, vol. 7, issue 2, 189-205

Abstract: The gift-exchange game is a form of sequential prisoner's dilemma, developed by Fehr et al. (1993), and popularized in a series of papers by Ernst Fehr and co-authors. While the European studies typically feature a high degree of gift exchange, the few U.S. studies provide some conflicting results. We find that the degree of gift exchange is surprisingly sensitive to an apparently innocuous change--whether or not a comprehensive payoff table is provided in the instructions. We also find significant and substantial time trends in responder behavior.

Date: 2004
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (130)

Downloads: (external link)
http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/1386-4157/contents (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
Working Paper: How Robust is Laboratory Gift Exchange? (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:expeco:v:7:y:2004:i:2:p:189-205

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/10683/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

Experimental Economics is currently edited by David J. Cooper, Lata Gangadharan and Charles N. Noussair

More articles in Experimental Economics from Springer, Economic Science Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().