Theory and Decision

1997 - 2025

Current editor(s): Mohammed Abdellaoui

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Long-Term Behavior in the Theory of Moves pp. 201-240: Stephen Willson
Aspects of Arranged Marriages and the Theory of Markov Decision Processes pp. 241-253: Amitrajeet Batabyal
Simple Characterizations of the Nash and Kalai/smorodinsky Solutions pp. 255-261: Nejat Anbarci
Backward Induction Is Not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem pp. 263-289: Steven Brams and D. Kilgour
On Stalnaker's Notion of Strong Rationalizability and Nash Equilibrium in Perfect Information Games pp. 291-295: Giacomo Bonanno and Klaus Nehring
Response to Bonanno and Nehring pp. 297-299: Robert Stalnaker

Evolutionary Equilibria: Characterization Theorems and Their Implications pp. 99-159: Jonathan Bendor and Piotr Swistak
Social Structure, Economic Performance and Pareto Optimality pp. 161-173: Paul Thistle
On the Analysis of Negative Freedom pp. 175-197: Martin van Hees

Rational choice on non-finite sets by means of expansion-contraction axioms pp. 1-17: M. Carmen Sánchez
The Optimality of the Expert and Majority Rules Under Exponentially Distributed Competence pp. 19-36: Luba Sapir
An Empirical Comparison of Probabilistic Coalition Structure Theories in 3-Person Sidepayment Games pp. 37-82: H. Michener and Daniel Myers
Rewarding Trust: An Experimental Study pp. 83-98: Friedel Bolle

A Shortcut Method of Calculating the Distribution of Election Outcome Types Under Approval Voting pp. 211-220: Miles Sonstegaard
A Note on the Computation of the Mean Random Consistency Index of the Analytic Hierarchy Process (Ahp) pp. 221-230: V.M. Rao Tummala and Hong Ling
Ramsey's Foundations Extended to Desirabilities pp. 231-278: Jordan Howard Sobel
Echelons in Incomplete Relations pp. 279-292: Robert Delver and Herman Monsuur
Consensus By Identifying Extremists pp. 293-301: Robin Hanson

Axiomatization of a class of share functions for n-person games pp. 117-148: Gerard van der Laan and Rene van den Brink
Game Trees For Decision Analysis pp. 149-171: Prakash Shenoy
On Preference and Freedom pp. 173-198: Prasanta Pattanaik and Yongsheng Xu
Two-Person and majority continuous aggregation in 2-good space in Social Choice: a note pp. 199-209: I.D.A. Macintyre

Multistage Game Models and Delay Supergames pp. 1-36: Reinhard Selten
Nash Equilibrium with Lower Probabilities pp. 37-66: Ebbe Groes, Hans Jørgen Jacobsen, Birgitte Sloth and Torben Tranaes
Impossibility theorems for normal form games pp. 67-81: David Squires
The Bicameral Postulates and Indices of a Priori Voting Power pp. 83-116: Dan Felsenthal, Moshé Machover and William Zwicker

Order relations among efficient decision rules pp. 209-218: Jacob Paroush
On Playing Fair: Professor Binmore on Game Theory and the Social Contract pp. 219-239: Mohammed Dore
Economics of Radiation Protection: Equity Considerations pp. 241-251: Thierry Schneider, Caroline Schieber, Louis Eeckhoudt and Christian Gollier
Perspectives on a Pair of Envelopes pp. 253-277: Piers Rawling
On Seidenfeld‘s Criticism of Sophisticated Violations of the Independence Axiom 1 pp. 279-292: Wlodek Rabinowicz
Hidden Assumptions in the Dutch Book Argument pp. 293-312: C. Waidacher

Stochastic evolution of rationality pp. 107-138: Jean-Claude Falmagne and Jean-Paul Doignon
Discount-neutral utility models for denumerable time streams pp. 139-166: Peter Fishburn and Ward Edwards
Preference for gradual resolution of uncertainty pp. 167-185: Martin Ahlbrecht and Martin Weber
Sequential asymmetric auctions with endogenous participation pp. 187-202: Flavio Menezes and Paulo Monteiro
Two applications of a theorem of Dvoretsky, Wald, and Wolfovitz to cake division pp. 203-207: Julius Barbanel and William Zwicker

PAYOFF DOMINANCE AND THE STACKELBERG HEURISTIC pp. 1-19: Andrew Colman and Michael Bacharach
IN DEFENSE OF A CONSTRUCTIVE, INFORMATION-BASED APPROACH TO DECISION THEORY pp. 21-44: M. Yilmaz
Violations of Present-Value Maximization in Income Choice pp. 45-69: Gary Gigliotti and Barry Sopher
THE GENERALIZED HARMONIC MEAN AND A PORTFOLIO PROBLEM WITH DEPENDENT ASSETS pp. 71-87: Masaaki Kijima
NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICS IN MULTICRITERIA ANALYSIS pp. 89-105: Antonino Scarelli and Lorenzo Venzi

Tempered Regrets Under Total Ignorance pp. 207-213: Mary Acker
De minimis and equity in risk pp. 215-233: Karl Mosler
Risk, uncertainty and hidden information pp. 235-269: Stephen Morris
Correlated strategies as Institutions pp. 271-285: Daniel Arce
Joint Beliefs in Conflictual Coordination Games pp. 287-310: Peter Vanderschraaf and Diana Richards

Bargaining with Incomplete information an axiomatic approach pp. 105-146: Joachim Rosenmüller
EVOLUTION AND ULTIMATUM BARGAINING pp. 147-175: William Harms
FORWARD INDUCTION IN GAMES WITH AN OUTSIDE OPTION pp. 177-192: Gonzalo Olcina
CONGESTION MODELS AND WEIGHTED BAYESIAN POTENTIAL GAMES pp. 193-206: Giovanni Facchini, Freek van Megen, Peter Borm and Stef Tijs

LEXICOGRAPHIC ADDITIVITY FOR MULTI-ATTRIBUTE PREFERENCES ON FINITE SETS pp. 1-19: Yutaka Nakamura
The sure thing principle and the value of information pp. 21-36: Edward SchleeE
RISK AND THE VALUE OF INFORMATION IN IRREVERSIBLE DECISIONS pp. 37-51: Hans Gersbach
The undecidability of the spatialized prisoner's dilemma pp. 53-80: Patrick Grim
BARGAINING AND DELAY: THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL INFORMATION pp. 81-104: Charles Hyde