Theory and Decision

1997 - 2025

Current editor(s): Mohammed Abdellaoui

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Helping patients and physicians reach individualized medical decisions: theory and application to prenatal diagnostic testing pp. 451-467: Edi Karni, Moshe Leshno and Sivan Rapaport
Ellsberg games pp. 469-509: Frank Riedel and Linda Sass
Independence of irrelevant alternatives revisited pp. 511-527: Sususmu Cato
Inequality aversion and antisocial punishment pp. 529-545: Christian Thöni
Fair division of indivisible items between two players: design parameters for Contested Pile methods pp. 547-572: Rudolf Vetschera and D. Kilgour
On fairness of equilibria in economies with differential information pp. 573-599: Achille Basile, Maria Graziano and Marialaura Pesce

If nudge cannot be applied: a litmus test of the readers’ stance on paternalism pp. 297-315: Chen Li, Zhihua Li and Peter Wakker
On the significance of the prior of a correct decision in committees pp. 317-327: Ruth Ben-Yashar and Shmuel Nitzan
A geometric approach to revealed preference via Hamiltonian cycles pp. 329-341: Jan Heufer
Games with a local permission structure: separation of authority and value generation pp. 343-361: Rene van den Brink and Chris Dietz
Delegation and motivation pp. 363-393: Lukas Angst and Karol Borowiecki
Costly and discrete communication: an experimental investigation pp. 395-417: Sean Duffy, Tyson Hartwig and John Smith
Hold or roll: reaching the goal in jeopardy race games pp. 419-450: Darryl Seale, William Stein and Amnon Rapoport

Theory and implementation of coalitional analysis in cooperative decision making pp. 147-171: Haiyan Xu, D. Kilgour, Keith Hipel and Edward McBean
Randomized dictatorship and the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution pp. 173-177: Shiran Rachmilevitch
Mutual Fund Theorem for continuous time markets with random coefficients pp. 179-199: Nikolai Dokuchaev
Use of data on planned contributions and stated beliefs in the measurement of social preferences pp. 201-223: Anna Conte and Maria Levati
Entitlement and the efficiency-equality trade-off: an experimental study pp. 225-240: Agnes Bäker, Werner Güth, Kerstin Pull and Manfred Stadler
Motivation and mission in the public sector: evidence from the World Values Survey pp. 241-263: Edd Cowley and Sarah Smith
Stronger utility pp. 265-286: Pavlo Blavatskyy
Decreasing higher-order absolute risk aversion and higher-degree stochastic dominance pp. 287-295: Michel Denuit and Liqun Liu

Common consequence effects in pricing and choice pp. 1-7: Ulrich Schmidt and Stefan Trautmann
Hyperbolic discount curves: a reply to Ainslie pp. 9-30: Andrew Musau
Experimental Cournot oligopoly and inequity aversion pp. 31-45: Doruk İriş and Luis Santos-Pinto
An experimental investigation of intrinsic motivations for giving pp. 47-67: Mirco Tonin and Michael Vlassopoulos
Equilibrium and potential in coalitional congestion games pp. 69-79: Sergey Kuniavsky and Rann Smorodinsky
Benchmark values for higher order coefficients of relative risk aversion pp. 81-94: Michel Denuit and Beatrice Rey
Different carrots and different sticks: do we reward and punish differently than we approve and disapprove? pp. 95-118: Andreas Leibbrandt and Raúl López-Pérez
The econometric modelling of social preferences pp. 119-145: Anna Conte and Peter Moffatt

Measuring risk aversion with lists: a new bias pp. 465-496: Antoni Bosch-Domènech and Joaquim Silvestre
Reining in excessive risk-taking by executives: the effect of accountability pp. 497-517: Mathieu Lefebvre and Ferdinand Vieider
A parsimonious model of subjective life expectancy pp. 519-541: Alexander Ludwig and Alexander Zimper
Maximin play in completely mixed strategic games pp. 543-561: Vitaly Pruzhansky
Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness pp. 563-579: Sususmu Cato
Characterizing referenda with quorums via strategy-proofness pp. 581-597: Marc Pauly
Market failure in light of non-expected utility pp. 599-619: Eyal Baharad and Doron Kliger

Who gains from information asymmetry? pp. 305-337: Gil Epstein and Yosef Mealem
Stability and efficiency in perfect foresight situation pp. 339-357: Yoshio Kamijo
Optimal allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities pp. 359-387: Isabelle Brocas
Endowment Effect in negotiations: group versus individual decision-making pp. 389-401: Amira Galin
On the independence of history: experience spill-overs between experiments pp. 403-419: Astrid Matthey and Tobias Regner
Varying the number of bidders in the first-price sealed-bid auction: experimental evidence for the one-shot game pp. 421-447: Sascha Füllbrunn and Tibor Neugebauer
On recursive solutions to simple allocation problems pp. 449-463: Özgür Kıbrıs

The impact of governmental assistance on insurance demand under ambiguity: a theoretical model and an experimental test pp. 153-174: Marielle Brunette, Laure Cabantous, Stéphane Couture and Anne Stenger
Individual vs. couple behavior: an experimental investigation of risk preferences pp. 175-191: Mohammed Abdellaoui, Olivier l’Haridon and Corina Paraschiv
Aspirations as reference points: an experimental investigation of risk behavior over time pp. 193-210: Arvid Hoffmann, Sam Henry and Nikos Kalogeras
Experimental evidence on case-based decision theory pp. 211-232: Wolfgang Ossadnik, Dirk Wilmsmann and Benedikt Niemann
Min- and Max-induced rankings: an experimental study pp. 233-266: Amélie Vrijdags
Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication pp. 267-291: Johanna Hertel and John Smith
A note on local spillovers, convexity, and the strategic substitutes property in networks pp. 293-304: Pascal Billand, Christophe Bravard and Sudipta Sarangi

Information and ambiguity: herd and contrarian behaviour in financial markets pp. 1-15: J. Ford, David Kelsey and W. Pang
Emotional balance and probability weighting pp. 17-41: Narat Charupat, Richard Deaves, Travis Derouin, Marcelo Klotzle and Peter Miu
Pareto utility pp. 43-57: Masako Ikefuji, Roger Laeven, Jan Magnus and Chris Muris
Varieties of failure of monotonicity and participation under five voting methods pp. 59-77: Dan Felsenthal and Nicolaus Tideman
Justification of functional form assumptions in structural models: a correction pp. 79-83: John Dagsvik
Best-of-two contests with psychological effects pp. 85-100: Alex Krumer
Why do groups cooperate more than individuals to reduce risks? pp. 101-116: Min Gong, Jonathan Baron and Howard Kunreuther
Strategic collusion in auctions with externalities pp. 117-136: Omer Biran
Are moral norms distinct from social norms? A critical assessment of Jon Elster and Cristina Bicchieri pp. 137-152: Benoît Dubreuil and Jean-François Grégoire