Theory and Decision

1997 - 2025

Current editor(s): Mohammed Abdellaoui

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Linear symmetric rankings for TU-games pp. 461-484: L. Hernández-Lamoneda and F. Sánchez-Sánchez
Subgame perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model with deterministic procedures pp. 485-500: Liang Mao
Clan information market games pp. 501-517: Saadia Obadi and Silvia Miquel
For whom does social comparison induce risk-taking? pp. 519-541: Oege Dijk
Prospect theory and tax evasion: a reconsideration of the Yitzhaki puzzle pp. 543-565: Amedeo Piolatto and Matthew Rablen
Estimating cumulative prospect theory parameters from an international survey pp. 567-596: Marc Oliver Rieger, Mei Wang and Thorsten Hens
Outsourcing with identical suppliers and shortest-first policy: a laboratory experiment pp. 597-615: Flip Klijn and Marc Vorsatz

Catastrophic risk: social influences on insurance decisions pp. 309-326: Michal Krawczyk, Stefan Trautmann and Gijs Kuilen
Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion pp. 327-339: Mehdi Ayouni and Frederic Koessler
Punishing greediness in divide-the-dollar games pp. 341-351: Shiran Rachmilevitch
The valuation “by-tranche” of composite investment instruments pp. 353-393: Doron Sonsino, Mosi Rosenboim and Tal Shavit
Is diversity in capabilities desirable when adding decision makers? pp. 395-402: Ruth Ben-Yashar and Shmuel Nitzan
Piecewise linear rank-dependent utility pp. 403-414: Craig Webb
Information transparency and equilibrium selection in coordination games: an experimental study pp. 415-433: Jia Liu and Yohanes Riyanto
Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks pp. 435-459: Messan Agbaglah

Explaining robust additive utility models by sequences of preference swaps pp. 151-183: K. Belahcene, C. Labreuche, N. Maudet, V. Mousseau and W. Ouerdane
A simple framework for the axiomatization of exponential and quasi-hyperbolic discounting pp. 185-210: Nina Anchugina
Gender differences in ambiguity aversion under different outcome correlation structures pp. 211-219: Andreas Friedl, Patrick Ring and Ulrich Schmidt
Social comparison and risk taking behavior pp. 221-248: Astrid Gamba, Elena Manzoni and Luca Stanca
The efficiency of crackdowns: a lab-in-the-field experiment in public transportations pp. 249-271: Zhixin Dai, Fabio Galeotti and Marie Claire Villeval
Pool size and the sustainability of optimal risk-sharing agreements pp. 273-303: Francesca Barigozzi, Renaud Bourlès, Dominique Henriet and Giuseppe Pignataro
A note on a recent paper by Dagsvik on IIA and random utilities pp. 305-307: P. O. Lindberg and Tony E. Smith

Regular preorders and behavioral indifference pp. 1-12: Mauricio Ribeiro and Gil Riella
Risk-induced discounting pp. 13-30: Marc St-Pierre
Resolute majority rules pp. 31-39: Hyewon Jeong and Biung-Ghi Ju
Sleepiness, choice consistency, and risk preferences pp. 41-73: Marco Castillo, David Dickinson and Ragan Petrie
Modelling curiosity in decision-making pp. 75-91: Kusha Baharlou
How does socio-economic environment influence the distribution of altruism? pp. 93-116: Hideaki Goto
Leadership and the effective choice of information regime pp. 117-129: Mana Komai, Philip Grossman and Evelyne Benie
A model of scholarly publishing with hybrid academic journals pp. 131-150: Damien Besancenot and Radu Vranceanu

An expected utility theory for state-dependent preferences pp. 467-478: Edi Karni and David Schmeidler
Quantum-like models cannot account for the conjunction fallacy pp. 479-510: Thomas Boyer-Kassem, Sébastien Duchêne and Eric Guerci
Bid pooling in reverse multi-unit Dutch auctions: an experimental investigation pp. 511-534: Philippe Gillen, Alexander Rasch, Achim Wambach and Peter Werner
The possibility of Arrovian social choice with the process of nomination pp. 535-552: Yukinori Iwata
Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium under strategic delegation: an equivalence result pp. 553-570: Giorgos Stamatopoulos
Multiple rounds in a chain store game pp. 571-579: Michael Melles and Rainer Nitsche
Who are the voluntary leaders? Experimental evidence from a sequential contribution game pp. 581-599: Raphaële Préget, Phu Nguyen-Van and Marc Willinger
Optimal group composition for efficient division of labor pp. 601-618: Takuya Sekiguchi

Nash was a first to axiomatize expected utility pp. 309-312: Han Bleichrodt, Chen Li, Ivan Moscati and Peter Wakker
Ambiguity attitudes, framing, and consistency pp. 313-337: Alex Voorhoeve, Ken Binmore, Arnaldur Stefansson and Lisa Stewart
Hart–Mas-Colell implementation of the discounted Shapley value pp. 357-369: Tomohiko Kawamori
On the existence of altruistic value and utility functions pp. 371-391: Jay Simon
Order of limits in reputations pp. 393-411: Nuh Aygün Dalkıran
Consistency, population solidarity, and egalitarian solutions for TU-games pp. 427-447: Rene van den Brink, Youngsub Chun, Yukihiko Funaki and Boram Park
Compromising in bifocal distribution games: the average value pp. 449-465: Pedro Gadea-Blanco, José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez and M. Carmen Marco-Gil

Peter Fishburn’s analysis of ambiguity pp. 153-165: Mark Shattuck and Carl Wagner
Lexicographic expected utility without completeness pp. 167-176: Dino Borie
Choquet expected utility with affine capacities pp. 177-187: Pascal Toquebeuf
Rational beliefs in rationalizability pp. 189-198: Xiao Luo
Approval elections with a variable number of winners pp. 199-211: D. Marc Kilgour
Counting votes in coupled decisions pp. 213-253: Andreas Wendemuth and Italo Simonelli
The promise of pick-the-winners contests for producing crowd probability forecasts pp. 255-278: Phillip E. Pfeifer
Satisficing, preferences, and social interaction: a new perspective pp. 279-308: Wynn C. Stirling and Teppo Felin

A Condorcet jury theorem for couples pp. 1-15: Ingo Althöfer and Raphael Thiele
‘Divide-and-choose’ in list-based decision problems pp. 17-31: Dinko Dimitrov, Saptarshi Mukherjee and Nozomu Muto
Veto players and equilibrium uniqueness in the Baron–Ferejohn model pp. 33-52: Levent Celik and Bilgehan Karabay
Transfers and exchange-stability in two-sided matching problems pp. 53-71: Emiliya Lazarova, Peter Borm and Arantza Estévez-Fernández
Good manners: signaling social preferences pp. 73-88: Russell Golman
A note on monotonic power indices, smaller coalitions, and new members pp. 89-100: Dominik Karos
Cognitive ability and the effect of strategic uncertainty pp. 101-121: Nobuyuki Hanaki, Nicolas Jacquemet, Stéphane Luchini and Adam Zylbersztejn
Minimizing regret in dynamic decision problems pp. 123-151: Joseph Halpern and Samantha Leung