Ingratiation and Favoritism in Organizations

Agnieszka Rusinowska and Vassili Vergopoulos

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2020, vol. 176, issue 3, 413-445

Abstract: We study within one theoretical framework two related phenomena - ingratiation by subordinates and favoritism of superiors towards their employees. We express ingratiation by opinion conformity of the worker when reporting his opinion to the manager. Favoritism of the manager is inferred from a bias when reporting toa firm her observation of the worker's performance. We show interdependences of favoritism and ingratiation by investigating their influence on wages and profit. We study the more sophisticated manager and firm that try to infer the worker's opinion and the manager's observation. Such higher degrees of sophistication can mitigate the consequences of ingratiation and favoritism.

Keywords: influence; ingratiation; opinion conformity; favoritism; organization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C65 D2 D8 L2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Related works:
Working Paper: Ingratiation and favoritism in organizations (2020)
Working Paper: Ingratiation and favoritism in organizations (2020)
Working Paper: Ingratiation and favoritism in organizations (2020)
Working Paper: Ingratiation and Favoritism in Organizations (2016)
Working Paper: Ingratiation and Favoritism in Organizations (2016)
Working Paper: Ingratiation and Favoritism in Organizations (2016)
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DOI: 10.1628/jite-2020-0032

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