Spatial Voting with Endogenous Timing

Steffen Huck, Vicki Knoblauch () and Wieland Müller
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Wieland Müller

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2006, vol. 162, issue 4, 557-570

Abstract: We consider a model of (spatial) voting with endogenous timing. In line with actual political campaigns, candidates can decide endogenously when and where to locate. More specifically, we analyze endogenous timing in a two-period n-candidate spatial-voting game. We show that this game possesses a pure-strategy equilibrium (Osborne [1993]) but no - or only very complex - subgame-perfect equilibria. We demonstrate the latter point by analyzing the subgame-perfect equilibria in a three-candidate game. Our results show that allowing for endogenous timing can eliminate some of the more unappealing equilibrium characteristics of the standard model.

JEL-codes: C72 D72 R10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Spatial voting with endogenous timing (2006)
Working Paper: Spatial Voting with Endogenous Timing (2004)
Working Paper: Spatial Voting with Endogenous Timing (2004)
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