The puzzle of human cooperation

Ernst Fehr and Simon Gächter

Nature, 2003, vol. 421, issue 6926, 912-912

Abstract: Abstract The claim by Johnson et al. that human cooperation in social-dilemma games violates rational-choice theory is not justified1. If people have altruistic aims, altruistic behaviour is a rational means by which to achieve their proximate goals. From an evolutionary viewpoint, we need to explain why humans are often altruistic by strong reciprocity2,3,4. Although kin selection, reciprocal altruism and indirect reciprocity explain relevant forms of human cooperation5,6,7, they do not ultimately explain strong reciprocity8.

Date: 2003
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DOI: 10.1038/421912a

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