Bonuses and Promotion Tournaments: Theory and Evidence
Emre Ekinci,
Antti Kauhanen () and
Michael Waldman
The Economic Journal, 2019, vol. 129, issue 622, 2342-2389
Abstract:
Standard models of promotion tournaments do not distinguish between wages and bonuses and thus cannot explain variation in the use of bonuses. We combine classic and market-based tournament theories to develop a model in which wages and bonuses serve distinctly different roles. We use this model to derive testable predictions which we test employing both a single firm data set and a data set encompassing a large segment of the Finnish economy. Our empirical analysis supports the testable predictions and shows that our theoretical approach better matches the data than alternative theories of bonus determination based on arguments already in the literature.
Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)
Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/ecoj.12631 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:econjl:v:129:y:2019:i:622:p:2342-2389.
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals
Access Statistics for this article
The Economic Journal is currently edited by Francesco Lippi
More articles in The Economic Journal from Royal Economic Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press () and ().