A Model of Expertise

Vijay Krishna and John Morgan

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2001, vol. 116, issue 2, 747-775

Abstract: We study a model in which perfectly informed experts offer advice to a decision maker whose actions affect the welfare of all. Experts are biased and thus may wish to pull the decision maker in different directions and to different degrees. When the decision maker consults only a single expert, the expert withholds substantial information from the decision maker. We ask whether this situation is improved by having the decision maker sequentially consult two experts. We first show that there is no perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which full revelation occurs. When both experts are biased in the same direction, it is never beneficial to consult both. In contrast, when experts are biased in opposite directions, it is always beneficial to consult both. Indeed, in this case full revelation may be induced in an extended debate by introducing the possibility of rebuttal.

Date: 2001
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (234)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1162/00335530151144159 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: A Model of Expertise (1999)
Working Paper: A Model of Expertise (1999)
Working Paper: A Model of Expertise (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:116:y:2001:i:2:p:747-775.

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

The Quarterly Journal of Economics is currently edited by Robert J. Barro, Lawrence F. Katz, Nathan Nunn, Andrei Shleifer and Stefanie Stantcheva

More articles in The Quarterly Journal of Economics from President and Fellows of Harvard College
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().