A Model of Expertise

Vijay Krishna and John Morgan

Working Papers from Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs

Abstract: We study a model in which two perfectly informed experts offer advice to a decision maker whose actions affect the welfare of all. Experts are biased and thusmay wish to pull the decision maker in different directions and to different degrees. When the decision maker consults only a single expert, the expert withholds substantial information from the decision maker.

Keywords: INFORMATION; SOCIAL CHOICE; DECISION MAKING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A Model of Expertise (2001)
Working Paper: A Model of Expertise (1999)
Working Paper: A Model of Expertise (1999)
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