Economics of Governance

2000 - 2025

Current editor(s): Amihai Glazer and Marko Koethenbuerger

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Large shareholders and corporate governance pp. 297-321: Pascal Frantz and Norvald Instefjord
Counter-intuitive effects of domestic law enforcement policies in the United States pp. 323-343: Adam Jacobsson and Alberto Naranjo
Corruption clubs: endogenous thresholds in corruption and development pp. 345-373: M. Emranul Haque and Richard Kneller
Judicial checks on corruption in the United States pp. 375-401: Adriana Cordis

Growth, public investment and corruption with failing institutions pp. 187-219: David de la Croix and Clara Delavallade
“Rulers ruled by women”: an economic analysis of the rise and fall of women’s rights in ancient Sparta pp. 221-245: Robert Fleck and F. Andrew Hanssen
Evolutionary stability of altruism and envy in Tullock contests pp. 247-259: Frederik Schmidt
The political economy of environmental and social security policies: the role of environmental lobbying pp. 261-296: Tetsuo Ono

Democracy, autocracy and the likelihood of international conflict pp. 99-117: Thomas Tangerås
The economic evolution of democracy pp. 119-145: Christopher Ellis and John Fender
Incorporating morale into a classical agency model: implications for incentives, effort, and organization pp. 147-164: C. Stowe
Democracy and trade: an empirical study pp. 165-186: Jessica Decker and Jamus Lim

Corporate governance and pay for performance: evidence from Germany pp. 1-26: Jeremy Edwards, Wolfgang Eggert and Alfons Weichenrieder
Investment, expropriation, and unionization pp. 27-42: Tapio Palokangas
Electoral control over policy-motivated candidates and their policy biases pp. 43-64: Kimiko Terai
Federal budget allocation in an emergent democracy: evidence from Argentina pp. 65-83: José Bercoff and Osvaldo Meloni
Does the nationalization of party systems affect the composition of public spending? pp. 85-98: Ignacio Lago and Santiago Lago-Peñas

Voting between tax regimes to fund a public good pp. 287-303: Werner Güth and Rupert Sausgruber
Demutualization, outsider ownership, and stock exchange performance: empirical evidence pp. 305-339: Baris Serifsoy
Corruption, development and demography pp. 341-362: Keith Blackburn and Rashmi Sarmah
To dissent or not to dissent? Informative dissent and parliamentary governance pp. 363-392: Indridi Indridason

Does corruption affect health outcomes in the Philippines? pp. 197-244: Omar Azfar and Tugrul Gurgur
Causes of corruption: a survey of cross-country analyses and extended results pp. 245-263: Lorenzo Pellegrini and Reyer Gerlagh
The demand for judicial sanctions: voter information and the election of judges pp. 265-285: Steven Craig, Yi-Cheng Ho and Alan Satterlee

Editorial announcement pp. 101-101: Amihai Glazer and Robert Dur
Constitutions as self-enforcing redistributive schemes pp. 103-129: Dragan Filipovich and Jaume Sempere
The use (and abuse) of governance indicators in economics: a review pp. 131-175: Andrew Williams and Abu Siddique
Bureaucratic corruption and profit tax evasion pp. 177-196: Laszlo Goerke

Memorial essays in honor of Herschel I. Grossman: Introduction pp. 1-4: Michelle Garfinkel
The war against drug producers pp. 5-23: Herschel Grossman and Daniel Mejia
An economic approach to analyzing civil wars pp. 25-44: Stergios Skaperdas
Civil conflict and secessions pp. 45-63: Enrico Spolaore
All in the family: why non-democratic leaders have more children pp. 65-85: Dustin Beckett and Gregory Hess
Targeted political advertising and strategic behavior by uninformed voters pp. 87-100: Donald Wittman

Killing Private Ryan: An Institutional Analysis of Military Decision Making in World War II pp. 281-308: John Nye
Measures of the Amending Power of Government and Parliament. The Case of Italy 1988–2002 pp. 309-338: Silvia Fedeli and Francesco Forte
Complementarity, fiscal decentralization and economic growth pp. 339-362: Nobuo Akai, Yukihiro Nishimura and Masayo Sakata

Introduction pp. 179-179: Thomas Cusack, Amihai Glazer and Kai Konrad
Distortionary lobbying pp. 181-195: Mike Felgenhauer and Hans Grüner
A theory of rent seeking with informational foundations pp. 197-218: Johan Lagerlof
Confronting stylized facts with reality pp. 219-232: Andreas Busch
Political institutions and economic growth pp. 233-261: Laura Marsiliani and Thomas Renström
Dynamic Lobbying Conflicts pp. 263-279: Mattias K Polborn and Zaruhi Sahakyan

Politics in wage setting: does government colour matter? pp. 95-109: Kåre Johansen, Ørjan Mydland and Bjarne Strøm
Party alternation, divided government, and fiscal performance within US States pp. 111-128: Peter Calcagno and Monica Escaleras
The Effects of Corporate Governance on the Informativeness of Earnings pp. 129-152: Steven Petra
Restricting capital outflow pp. 153-177: Roni Frish

Money, religion and revolution pp. 1-16: Robert MacCulloch and Silvia Pezzini
Tax Competition between Unitary and Federal Countries pp. 17-36: Lisa Grazzini and Alessandro Petretto
Budgetary Procedures and Deficits in Norwegian Local Governments pp. 37-49: Per Tovmo
Local Public Debt with Overlapping Generations pp. 51-59: Hikaru Ogawa and Mitsuhiro Yano
Non-cooperative Households and the Size and Composition of Public Expenditure pp. 61-81: Dan Anderberg and Alessandro Balestrino
Political Leadership, Conflict and the Prospects for Constitutional Peace pp. 83-94: Colin Jennings