Economics of Governance

2000 - 2026

Current editor(s): Amihai Glazer and Marko Koethenbuerger

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Institutional details matter—more economic effects of direct democracy pp. 287-310: Lorenz Blume and Stefan Voigt
Democracy, populism and hyperinflation: some evidence from Latin America pp. 311-332: Manoel Bittencourt
Political competition versus electoral participation: effects on government’s size pp. 333-363: Dalibor Eterovic and Nicolás Eterovic
Serving the many or serving the most needy? pp. 365-386: Christoph Starke

Editorial pp. 193-193: Amihai Glazer and Mattias K Polborn
Emotions in litigation contests pp. 195-215: Florian Baumann and Tim Friehe
Institutional quality, governance, and financial development pp. 217-236: Siong Hook Law and W.N.w Azman-Saini
Fiscal decentralization and multinational firms’ ownership: evidence from China pp. 237-262: Shih-Ying Wu and Mei-Jane Teng
Corruption, institutions and regulation pp. 263-285: Michael Breen and Robert Gillanders

Property rights out of anarchy? The Demsetz hypothesis in a game of conflict pp. 95-120: John Boyce and David Bruner
Firm break-up and performance pp. 121-143: Evžen Kočenda and Jan Hanousek
Effects of rent dependency on quality of government pp. 145-168: Mette Anthonsen, Åsa Löfgren, Klas Nilsson and Joakim Westerlund
Corruption, institutions and trade pp. 169-192: Yaron Zelekha and Eyal Sharabi

On the optimal design of disaster insurance in a federation pp. 1-27: Timothy Goodspeed and Andrew Haughwout
Escalating penalties: a supergame approach pp. 29-49: Alfred Endres and Bianca Rundshagen
Voting on devolution in a federal country with a bicameral national system pp. 51-72: Lisa Grazzini and Alessandro Petretto
Centralized and decentralized provision of public goods pp. 73-93: Janos Feidler and Klaas Staal

Do individual disclosure rules for parliamentarians improve government effectiveness? pp. 301-324: Anne Aaken and Stefan Voigt
Voting over selective immigration policies with immigration aversion pp. 325-351: Giuseppe Russo
Retirement and social security: the roles of self-fulfilling expectations and educational investments pp. 353-383: Ryo Arawatari and Tetsuo Ono
How economic integration affects the vertical structure of the public sector pp. 385-402: Paolo Liberati and Antonio Sciala'

Time horizons matter: the hazard rate of coalition governments and the size of government pp. 201-235: Sergio Bejar, Bumba Mukherjee and Will Moore
Endogenous elites: power structure and patron-client relationships pp. 237-258: Petros Sekeris
Unemployment and gang crime: can prosperity backfire? pp. 259-273: Panu Poutvaara and Mikael Priks
Is the tax administration just a money machine? Empirical evidence on redistributive politics pp. 275-299: Alejandro Esteller-Moré

Does government ideology influence budget composition? Empirical evidence from OECD countries pp. 101-134: Niklas Potrafke
Competition for private capital and central grants: the case of Japanese industrial parks pp. 135-154: Shun-ichiro Bessho and Kimiko Terai
Measures of corruption and determinants of US corruption pp. 155-176: Rajeev Goel and Michael Nelson
A property rights approach to legislative delegation pp. 177-200: Peter Grajzl

The costs of organized violence: a review of the evidence pp. 1-23: Stergios Skaperdas
Voter turnout in a multidimensional policy space pp. 25-49: Rafael Hortala-Vallve and Berta Esteve-Volart
Combatant recruitment and the outcome of war pp. 51-74: Ahmed Mahmud and Juan Vargas
Judiciaries in corrupt societies pp. 75-88: Mikael Priks
The infallibility of the pope pp. 89-99: Mario Ferrero

Media activity and public spending pp. 309-332: Christian Bruns and Oliver Himmler
Bribery and inspection technology pp. 333-350: Andrew Samuel and Aaron Lowen
When is it efficient to treat juvenile offenders more leniently than adult offenders? pp. 351-371: Derek Pyne
From plurality rule to proportional representation pp. 373-408: Selim Ergun

Kings and Vikings: on the dynamics of competitive agglomeration pp. 207-227: Matthew Baker and Erwin Bulte
On the different styles of large shareholders’ activism pp. 229-267: Jacob Oded and Yu Wang
Corruption, decentralization and yardstick competition pp. 269-294: Oguzhan Dincer, Christopher Ellis and Glen Waddell
Determinants of hierarchical structure in industrial firms: an empirical study pp. 295-308: Luis Façanha and Marcelo Resende

Introduction pp. 101-101: Johannes Münster and Stergios Skaperdas
National self-insurance and self-protection against adversity: bureaucratic management of security and moral hazard pp. 103-122: Toshihiro Ihori and Martin McGuire
Ethnic polarization and the duration of civil wars pp. 123-143: Jose Montalvo and Marta Reynal-Querol
The conflict mitigating effects of trade in the India-Pakistan case pp. 145-167: Dawood Mamoon and S. Murshed
Internalized social norms in conflicts: an evolutionary approach pp. 169-181: Erik Mohlin
Resources, conflict and development choices: public good provision in resource rich economies pp. 183-205: Mare Sarr and Katharina Wick

Editorial introduction pp. 1-2: Robert Dur and Amihai Glazer
The impact of referendums on the centralisation of public goods provision: a political economy approach pp. 3-26: Jan Schnellenbach, Lars Feld and Christoph Schaltegger
Corruption in dictatorships pp. 27-49: William Hallagan
Military coups and the consequences of durable de facto power: the case of Pakistan pp. 51-76: Aditya Bhave and Christopher Kingston
Threshold uncertainty in discrete public good games: an experimental study pp. 77-99: Michael McBride