Economics of Governance
2000 - 2025
Current editor(s): Amihai Glazer and Marko Koethenbuerger From Springer Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (). Access Statistics for this journal.
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Volume 14, issue 4, 2013
- The expert problem: a survey pp. 303-331

- Irene Valsecchi
- Who bribes in public contracting and why: worldwide evidence from firms pp. 333-367

- Anna D’Souza and Daniel Kaufmann
- Digging in the dirt? Extractive industry FDI and corruption pp. 369-383

- Ivar Kolstad and Arne Wiig
- Are we there yet? On the convergence of financial reforms pp. 385-409

- Jac Heckelman and Sandeep Mazumder
Volume 14, issue 3, 2013
- Fiscal restraints by advisors pp. 205-232

- Shun-ichiro Bessho and Kimiko Terai
- Public sector corruption and the probability of technological disasters pp. 233-255

- Eiji Yamamura
- Do bailouts buy votes? Evidence from a panel of Hessian municipalities pp. 257-278

- Thushyanthan Baskaran
- Moral hazard and the composition of transfers: theory and evidence from cross-border transfers pp. 279-301

- J. Atsu Amegashie, Bazoumana Ouattara and Eric Strobl
Volume 14, issue 2, 2013
- Determinants of post-congressional lobbying employment pp. 107-126

- Jin-Hyuk Kim
- Determinants of property rights institutions: survey of literature and new evidence pp. 127-183

- Abdoul’ Mijiyawa
- Central government control and fiscal adjustment: Norwegian evidence pp. 185-203

- Arnt Hopland
Volume 14, issue 1, 2013
- Financial integration in autocracies: Greasing the wheel or more to steal? pp. 1-22

- Ramin Dadasov, Philipp Harms and Oliver Lorz
- The ancient olympics as a signal of city-state strength pp. 23-44

- Douglas Allen and Vera Lantinova
- Political selection of public servants and parliamentary oversight pp. 45-76

- Thomas Braendle and Alois Stutzer
- The efficacy and efforts of interest groups in post elections policy formation pp. 77-105

- Gil Epstein, Yosef Mealem and Shmuel Nitzan
Volume 13, issue 4, 2012
- Institutional details matter—more economic effects of direct democracy pp. 287-310

- Lorenz Blume and Stefan Voigt
- Democracy, populism and hyperinflation: some evidence from Latin America pp. 311-332

- Manoel Bittencourt
- Political competition versus electoral participation: effects on government’s size pp. 333-363

- Dalibor Eterovic and Nicolás Eterovic
- Serving the many or serving the most needy? pp. 365-386

- Christoph Starke
Volume 13, issue 3, 2012
- Editorial pp. 193-193

- Amihai Glazer and Mattias K Polborn
- Emotions in litigation contests pp. 195-215

- Florian Baumann and Tim Friehe
- Institutional quality, governance, and financial development pp. 217-236

- Siong Hook Law and W.N.w Azman-Saini
- Fiscal decentralization and multinational firms’ ownership: evidence from China pp. 237-262

- Shih-Ying Wu and Mei-Jane Teng
- Corruption, institutions and regulation pp. 263-285

- Michael Breen and Robert Gillanders
Volume 13, issue 2, 2012
- Property rights out of anarchy? The Demsetz hypothesis in a game of conflict pp. 95-120

- John Boyce and David Bruner
- Firm break-up and performance pp. 121-143

- Evžen Kočenda and Jan Hanousek
- Effects of rent dependency on quality of government pp. 145-168

- Mette Anthonsen, Åsa Löfgren, Klas Nilsson and Joakim Westerlund
- Corruption, institutions and trade pp. 169-192

- Yaron Zelekha and Eyal Sharabi
Volume 13, issue 1, 2012
- On the optimal design of disaster insurance in a federation pp. 1-27

- Timothy Goodspeed and Andrew Haughwout
- Escalating penalties: a supergame approach pp. 29-49

- Alfred Endres and Bianca Rundshagen
- Voting on devolution in a federal country with a bicameral national system pp. 51-72

- Lisa Grazzini and Alessandro Petretto
- Centralized and decentralized provision of public goods pp. 73-93

- Janos Feidler and Klaas Staal
Volume 12, issue 4, 2011
- Do individual disclosure rules for parliamentarians improve government effectiveness? pp. 301-324

- Anne Aaken and Stefan Voigt
- Voting over selective immigration policies with immigration aversion pp. 325-351

- Giuseppe Russo
- Retirement and social security: the roles of self-fulfilling expectations and educational investments pp. 353-383

- Ryo Arawatari and Tetsuo Ono
- How economic integration affects the vertical structure of the public sector pp. 385-402

- Paolo Liberati and Antonio Sciala'
Volume 12, issue 3, 2011
- Time horizons matter: the hazard rate of coalition governments and the size of government pp. 201-235

- Sergio Bejar, Bumba Mukherjee and Will Moore
- Endogenous elites: power structure and patron-client relationships pp. 237-258

- Petros Sekeris
- Unemployment and gang crime: can prosperity backfire? pp. 259-273

- Panu Poutvaara and Mikael Priks
- Is the tax administration just a money machine? Empirical evidence on redistributive politics pp. 275-299

- Alejandro Esteller-Moré
Volume 12, issue 2, 2011
- Does government ideology influence budget composition? Empirical evidence from OECD countries pp. 101-134

- Niklas Potrafke
- Competition for private capital and central grants: the case of Japanese industrial parks pp. 135-154

- Shun-ichiro Bessho and Kimiko Terai
- Measures of corruption and determinants of US corruption pp. 155-176

- Rajeev Goel and Michael Nelson
- A property rights approach to legislative delegation pp. 177-200

- Peter Grajzl
Volume 12, issue 1, 2011
- The costs of organized violence: a review of the evidence pp. 1-23

- Stergios Skaperdas
- Voter turnout in a multidimensional policy space pp. 25-49

- Rafael Hortala-Vallve and Berta Esteve-Volart
- Combatant recruitment and the outcome of war pp. 51-74

- Ahmed Mahmud and Juan Vargas
- Judiciaries in corrupt societies pp. 75-88

- Mikael Priks
- The infallibility of the pope pp. 89-99

- Mario Ferrero
Volume 11, issue 4, 2010
- Media activity and public spending pp. 309-332

- Christian Bruns and Oliver Himmler
- Bribery and inspection technology pp. 333-350

- Andrew Samuel and Aaron Lowen
- When is it efficient to treat juvenile offenders more leniently than adult offenders? pp. 351-371

- Derek Pyne
- From plurality rule to proportional representation pp. 373-408

- Selim Ergun
Volume 11, issue 3, 2010
- Kings and Vikings: on the dynamics of competitive agglomeration pp. 207-227

- Matthew Baker and Erwin Bulte
- On the different styles of large shareholders’ activism pp. 229-267

- Jacob Oded and Yu Wang
- Corruption, decentralization and yardstick competition pp. 269-294

- Oguzhan Dincer, Christopher Ellis and Glen Waddell
- Determinants of hierarchical structure in industrial firms: an empirical study pp. 295-308

- Luis Façanha and Marcelo Resende
Volume 11, issue 2, 2010
- Introduction pp. 101-101

- Johannes Münster and Stergios Skaperdas
- National self-insurance and self-protection against adversity: bureaucratic management of security and moral hazard pp. 103-122

- Toshihiro Ihori and Martin McGuire
- Ethnic polarization and the duration of civil wars pp. 123-143

- Jose Montalvo and Marta Reynal-Querol
- The conflict mitigating effects of trade in the India-Pakistan case pp. 145-167

- Dawood Mamoon and S. Murshed
- Internalized social norms in conflicts: an evolutionary approach pp. 169-181

- Erik Mohlin
- Resources, conflict and development choices: public good provision in resource rich economies pp. 183-205

- Mare Sarr and Katharina Wick
Volume 11, issue 1, 2010
- Editorial introduction pp. 1-2

- Robert Dur and Amihai Glazer
- The impact of referendums on the centralisation of public goods provision: a political economy approach pp. 3-26

- Jan Schnellenbach, Lars Feld and Christoph Schaltegger
- Corruption in dictatorships pp. 27-49

- William Hallagan
- Military coups and the consequences of durable de facto power: the case of Pakistan pp. 51-76

- Aditya Bhave and Christopher Kingston
- Threshold uncertainty in discrete public good games: an experimental study pp. 77-99

- Michael McBride
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