Economics of Governance

2000 - 2025

Current editor(s): Amihai Glazer and Marko Koethenbuerger

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On evolutionarily stable behavior in contests pp. 177-186: Wolfgang Leininger
Organizational structure and innovative activity pp. 187-214: Dirk Sliwka
Efficiency wages, wage comparison, and public sector budgeting pp. 215-228: Kåre Johansen and Bjarne Strøm
How corruption affects persistent capital flows pp. 229-243: Johann Lambsdorff
Corporatism, policies and growth pp. 245-260: Fabio Padovano and Emma Galli
Social identity, inequality, and conflict: correction and extension pp. 261-267: Brian Hutter

On the negative social value of central banks' knowledge transparency pp. 91-102: Hans Gersbach
Sounding the alarm: Impact of political instability on growth and fiscal health of the Indian economy pp. 103-114: Mala Lalvani
Grants structure in an intergovernmental fiscal game pp. 115-126: Tracy Snoddon and Jean-Francois Wen
The political economy of regional opting out: distributive implications of a prospective Europe of Regions pp. 127-142: Giorgio Brosio and Federico Revelli
Deterrence versus intrinsic motivation: Experimental evidence on the determinants of corruptibility pp. 143-160: Günther Schulze and Björn Frank
Do congressional leaders detect and deter cartel cheating? Evidence from committee assignments pp. 161-175: Amanda B. Chittom and Franklin Mixon

Trade intensity, country size and corruption pp. 1-18: Stephen Knack and Omar Azfar
Measuring voting power in an international institution: the United States and the inter-American development bank pp. 19-36: Jonathan R. Strand
Political culture and foreign direct investment: The case of Italy pp. 37-56: Ram Mudambi and Pietro Navarra
Voting on public pensions with hands and feet pp. 57-80: Alexander Haupt and Wolfgang Peters
Lobbying contests with alternative instruments pp. 81-89: Gil Epstein and Carsten Hefeker

Corruption, economic growth, and income inequality in Africa pp. 183-209: Kwabena Gyimah-Brempong
How municipalities react to budgetary windfalls pp. 211-226: Bruno Heyndels and Frank Van Driessche
Central government subsidies to local public goods pp. 227-239: Nobuo Akai and Toshihiro Ihori
Pre-assigned rents and bureaucratic friction pp. 241-248: Nava Kahana and Shmuel Nitzan
Rational probation decisions for juvenile delinquents pp. 249-274: Oliver Fabel and Volker Meier

Trust breeds trust: How taxpayers are treated pp. 87-99: Lars Feld and Bruno Frey
Centralized versus decentralized decision-making in a county government setting pp. 101-115: Gökhan R. Karahan, Laura Razzolini and William Shughart
Rent-seeking in a unionised monopoly pp. 117-134: Odd Rune Straume
Vertical externalities and control of politicians pp. 135-151: Matthias Wrede
The flypaper effect and political strength pp. 153-170: Per Tovmo and Torberg Falch
Sources of inefficiency in representative democracy: Evidence on public investments across nations pp. 171-181: W. Crain

When should central bankers be fired? pp. 1-21: Carl Walsh
Does corruption affect income inequality and poverty? pp. 23-45: Sanjeev Gupta, Hamid Davoodi and Rosa Alonso-Terme
How to understand, and deal with dictatorship: an economist's view pp. 35-58: Ronald Wintrobe
Incumbency preservation through electoral legislation: The case of the secret ballot pp. 47-57: Jac Heckelman and Andrew Yates
Grants structure when the type of public project is endogenous pp. 59-69: Hikaru Ogawa
Frequent probabilistic punishment in law enforcement pp. 71-86: Orit Perry, Ido Erev and Ernan Haruvy

The political economy of organized crime: providing protection when the state does not pp. 173-202: Stergios Skaperdas
Endogenous institutions in bureaucratic compliance games pp. 203-229: Silvia Fedeli and Michele Santoni
Optimal law enforcement when victims are rational players pp. 231-242: Nuno Garoupa
The invalidity of the Condorcet Jury Theorem under endogenous decisional skills pp. 243-249: Ruth Ben-Yashar and Shmuel Nitzan

Information distortion and competitive remedies in government transfer programs: The case of ethanol pp. 101-134: Ronald N. Johnson and Gary Libecap
Growth and government: Is there a difference between developed and developing countries? pp. 135-157: Tove Strauss
Allocation of authority under central grants pp. 159-172: Hikaru Ogawa

Special Issue on Social Conflict – Preface pp. 1-1: Amihai Glazer and Kai Konrad
Targeting and political support for welfare spending pp. 3-24: Karl Ove Moene and Michael Wallerstein
Butter and guns: Complementarity between economic and military competition pp. 25-33: Herschel Grossman and Juan Mendoza
How to understand, and deal with dictatorship: an economist's view pp. 35-58: Ronald Wintrobe
Social decision rules are not immune to conflict pp. 59-67: Joan Esteban and Debraj Ray
Tax resistance, economy and state transformation in China and Europe pp. 69-83: R. Bin Wong
Social identity, inequality and conflict pp. 85-99: James Robinson

Regulation in a political economy: explaining limited commitment and the ratchet effect pp. 181-197: Roland Strausz
Social pressure, uncertainty, and cooperation pp. 199-212: Steffen Huck and Dorothea Kübler
On the cost-benefit of the regionalisation of the National Health Service pp. 213-232: Alessandro Petretto
Voting on welfare reform Stemming migration, assisting the needy, or promoting economic growth? pp. 233-259: Dennis Coates

Federalism, distributive politics and representative democracy pp. 105-122: Guillaume Cheikbossian
Institutional quality and poverty measures in a cross-section of countries pp. 123-135: Alberto Chong and Cesar Calderon
Rush, delay or money burning: Informational biases in policy decisions pp. 137-155: Hans Gersbach
Larceny pp. 157-179: Paul J. Zak

Editors' introduction pp. 1-2: Amihai Glazer and Kai Konrad
The state: Agent or proprietor? pp. 3-11: Herschel Grossman
Progressive ambition, electoral selection, and the creation of ideologues pp. 13-23: Joseph Harrington
Property rights and the evolution of the state pp. 25-51: Yoram Barzel
Establishing a reputation for dependability by means of inflation targets pp. 53-76: Alex Cukierman
The rationality of revolution pp. 77-103: Leonard Dudley