Behavioral strong implementation

T. Hayashi (), R. Jain (), Ville Korpela and Michele Lombardi
Additional contact information
T. Hayashi: University of Glasgow
R. Jain: University of Liverpool Management School

Economic Theory, 2023, vol. 76, issue 4, No 7, 1257-1287

Abstract: Abstract Choice behavior is rational if it is based on the maximization of some context-independent preference relation. This study re-examines the questions of implementation theory in a setting where players’ choice behavior need not be rational and coalition formation must be taken into account. Our model implies that with non-rational players, the formation of groups greatly affects the design exercise. As a by-product, we also propose a notion of behavioral efficiency and we compare it with existing notions.

Keywords: Strong equilibrium; Implementation; State-contingent choice rules; (behavioral) group strategy-proofness; Non-rational behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 D60 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01494-0

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