Behavioral Strong Implementation

T Hayashi (), Ritesh Jain, Ville Korpela and Michele Lombardi
Additional contact information
T Hayashi: Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow, https://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/business/

No 20-A002, IEAS Working Paper : academic research from Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan

Abstract: Choice behavior is rational if it is made in accordance with the maximization of some context-independent preference relation. This study re-examines the classical questions of implementation theory under complete information in a setting in which players' choices need not be rational and in which the game theoretic solution concept invoked is an extension of Aumann's (1959) notion of strong equilibrium beyond the rational domain. The proposed equilibrium notion incorporates a notion of Pareto optimality which refines, sometimes strictly, other extended notions of Pareto optimality proposed in the literature. In contrast to what happens when players' choices are rational, de Clippel's (2014) extension of Maskin monotonicity to non-rational domains is not a necessary condition for implementation in behavioral strong equilibria.

Keywords: : : Strong equilibrium; implementation; state-contingent choice rules; bounded rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 D60 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 58 pages
Date: 2020-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic, nep-ore and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Behavioral strong implementation (2023)
Working Paper: Behavioral Strong Implementation (2021)
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