Behavioral Strong Implementation

Takashi Hayashi, Ritesh Jain, Ville Korpela and Michele Lombardi
Additional contact information
Takashi Hayashi: Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow

No 141, Discussion Papers from Aboa Centre for Economics

Abstract: Choice behavior is rational if it is based on the maximization of some context-independent preference relation. This study re-examines the questions of implementation theory in a setting where players’ choice behavior need not be rational and coalition formation must be taken into account. Our model implies that with boundedly rational players, the formation of groups greatly affects the design exercise. As a by-product, we also propose a notion of behavioral efficiency and we compare it with existing notions.

Keywords: Strong equilibrium; implementation; state-contingent choice rules; bounded rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 D60 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45
Date: 2021-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-mic and nep-upt
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Related works:
Journal Article: Behavioral strong implementation (2023)
Working Paper: Behavioral Strong Implementation (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tkk:dpaper:dp141

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