Efficiency versus Equity in the Provision of In-Kind Benefits: Evidence from Cost Containment in the California WIC Program

Katherine Meckel, Maya Rossin-Slater and Lindsey Uniat

Journal of Human Resources, 2023, vol. 58, issue 2, 363-392

Abstract: The government often contracts with private firms to deliver in-kind safety net benefits. These public–private partnerships generate agency problems that could increase costs, but cost containment reforms may discourage firm participation. We study a 2012 reform of California’s Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children that reduced the number of small vendors. We show that within-zip-code access to small vendors increases take-up among first-time and foreign-born mothers, suggesting that small vendors are distinctly effective at lowering take-up barriers among women with high program learning costs. Thus, cost containment reforms may have unintended consequences of inequitably reducing program access.

JEL-codes: H40 I18 I38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
Note: DOI: https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.58.4.0120-10677R1
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://jhr.uwpress.org/cgi/reprint/58/2/363
A subscription is required to access pdf files. Pay per article is available.

Related works:
Working Paper: Efficiency Versus Equity in the Provision of In-Kind Benefits: Evidence from Cost Containment in the California WIC Program (2020)
Working Paper: Efficiency Versus Equity in the Provision of In-Kind Benefits: Evidence from Cost Containment in the California WIC Program (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uwp:jhriss:v:58:y:2023:i:2:p:363-392

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Human Resources from University of Wisconsin Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().