Efficiency Versus Equity in the Provision of In-Kind Benefits: Evidence from Cost Containment in the California WIC Program

Katherine Meckel, Maya Rossin-Slater () and Lindsey Uniat ()
Additional contact information
Maya Rossin-Slater: Stanford University
Lindsey Uniat: Yale University

No 12957, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: The government often contracts with private firms to deliver in-kind safety net benefits. These public-private partnerships generate agency problems that could increase costs, but cost-containment reforms may discourage firm participation. We study a 2012 reform of California's Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children that reduced the number of small vendors. We show that within-ZIP-code access to small vendors increases take-up among first-time and foreign-born mothers, suggesting that small vendors are distinctly effective at lowering take-up barriers among women with high program learning costs. Thus, cost containment reforms may have unintended consequences of inequitably reducing program access.

Keywords: WIC program; benefit take-up; in-kind transfers; cost containment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H40 I18 I38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2020-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Efficiency versus Equity in the Provision of In-Kind Benefits: Evidence from Cost Containment in the California WIC Program (2023)
Working Paper: Efficiency Versus Equity in the Provision of In-Kind Benefits: Evidence from Cost Containment in the California WIC Program (2020)
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