 The Distribution of Talent Across ContestsGhazala Azmat and Marc Möller Economic Journal, 2018, vol. 128, issue 609, 471-509 Abstract: Do the contests with the largest prizes attract the most able contestants? To what extent do contestants avoid competition? We show that the distribution of abilities is crucial in determining contest choice. Complete sorting exists only when the proportion of high†ability contestants is small. As this proportion increases, high†ability contestants shy away from competition and sorting decreases, making reverse sorting a possibility. We test our theoretical predictions with a large panel data set containing contest choice over 20 years. We use exogenous variation in the participation of highly able competitors to provide evidence for the relationship among prizes, competition and sorting. Date: 2018 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:econjl:v:128:y:2018:i:609:p:471-509 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Economic Journal is currently edited by Estelle Cantillon, Martin Cripps, Andrea Galeotti, Morten Ravn, Kjell G. Salvanes, Frederic Vermeulen, Hans-Joachim Voth and Rachel Kranton More articles in Economic Journal from Royal Economic Society Contact information at EDIRC. |
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