Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver
Anton Kolotilin (),
Andriy Zapechelnyuk and
Econometrica, 2017, vol. 85, issue 6, 1949-1964
We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A receiver has a private type and chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism or an experiment to disclose information about a payoff‐relevant state. A persuasion mechanism conditions information disclosure on the receiver's report about his type, whereas an experiment discloses information independent of the receiver's type. We establish the equivalence of implementation by persuasion mechanisms and by experiments, and characterize optimal persuasion mechanisms.
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Working Paper: PERSUASION OF A PRIVATELY INFORMED RECEIVER (2016)
Working Paper: Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver (2016)
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