Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver

Anton Kolotilin, Tymofiy Mylovanov, Andriy Zapechelnyuk and Ming Li

Econometrica, 2017, vol. 85, issue 6, 1949-1964

Abstract: We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A receiver has a private type and chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism or an experiment to disclose information about a payoff‐relevant state. A persuasion mechanism conditions information disclosure on the receiver's report about his type, whereas an experiment discloses information independent of the receiver's type. We establish the equivalence of implementation by persuasion mechanisms and by experiments, and characterize optimal persuasion mechanisms.

Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (82)

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https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA13251

Related works:
Working Paper: PERSUASION OF A PRIVATELY INFORMED RECEIVER (2016)
Working Paper: Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver (2016)
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