PERSUASION OF A PRIVATELY INFORMED RECEIVER
Anton Kolotilin (),
Andriy Zapechelnyuk and
Working Papers from Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow
We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A privately informed receiver chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mech- anism that can condition the information disclosed to the receiver on the receiver’s report about his type. We establish the equivalence of implementation by persua- sion mechanisms and by experiments. We also characterize the optimal persuasion mechanisms. In particular, if the density of the receiver’s type is log-concave, then the optimal persuasion mechanism reveals the state if and only if the state is below a threshold. We apply our results to the design of media censorship policies.
Keywords: Bayesian persuasion; information disclosure; information design; mech- anism design without transfers; experiments; persuasion mechanisms; media (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 L82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Journal Article: Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver (2017)
Working Paper: Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gla:glaewp:2016_22
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