Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver
Anton Kolotilin (),
Tymofiy Mylovanov (),
Andriy Zapechelnyuk and
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Tymofiy Mylovanov: University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics
No 2016-21, Discussion Papers from School of Economics, The University of New South Wales
We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A privately informed receiver chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism that can condition the information disclosed to the receiver on the receiver’s report about his type. We establish the equivalence of implementation by persuasion mechanisms and by experiments. We also characterize the optimal persuasion mechanisms. In particular, if the density of the receiver’s type is log-concave, then the optimal persuasion mechanism reveals the state if and only if the state is below a threshold. We apply our results to the design of media censorship policies.
Keywords: Bayesian persuasion; information disclosure; information design; mechanism design without transfers; experiments; persuasion mechanisms; media (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 L82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Journal Article: Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver (2017)
Working Paper: PERSUASION OF A PRIVATELY INFORMED RECEIVER (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:swe:wpaper:2016-21
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