Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications
Current editor(s): R.J. Aumann and S. Hart From Elsevier
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- Ch 33 Game theory and public economics , pp 1153-1192
- Mordecai Kurz
- Ch 34 Cost allocation , pp 1193-1235
- H. Young
- Ch 35 Cooperative models of bargaining , pp 1237-1284
- William Thomson
- Ch 36 Games in coalitional form , pp 1285-1303
- Robert Weber
- Ch 37 Coalition structures , pp 1305-1337
- Joseph Greenberg
- Ch 38 Game-theoretic aspects of computing , pp 1339-1395
- Nathan Linial
- Ch 39 Utility and subjective probability , pp 1397-1435
- Peter C. Fishburn
- Ch 40 Common knowledge , pp 1437-1496
- John Geanakoplos
- Ch 41 Strategic equilibrium , pp 1521-1596
- Eric van Damme
- Ch 42 Foundations of strategic equilibrium , pp 1597-1663
- John Hillas and Elon Kohlberg
- Ch 43 Incomplete information , pp 1665-1686
- Robert Aumann and Aviad Heifetz
- Ch 44 Non-zero-sum two-person games , pp 1687-1721
- T.E.S. Raghavan
- Ch 45 Computing equilibria for two-person games , pp 1723-1759
- Bernhard von Stengel
- Ch 46 Non-cooperative games with many players , pp 1761-1808
- M. Khan and Yeneng Sun
- Ch 47 Stochastic games , pp 1809-1832
- Jean-François Mertens
- Ch 48 Stochastic games: Recent results , pp 1833-1850
- Nicolas Vieille
- Ch 49 Game theory and industrial organization , pp 1851-1895
- Kyle Bagwell and Asher Wolinsky
- Ch 50 Bargaining with incomplete information , pp 1897-1945
- Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton and Raymond J. Deneckere
- Ch 51 Inspection games , pp 1947-1987
- Rudolf Avenhaus, Bernhard von Stengel and Shmuel Zamir
- Ch 52 Economic history and game theory , pp 1989-2024
- Avner Greif
- Ch 53 The shapley value , pp 2025-2054
- Eyal Winter
- Ch 54 Variations on the shapley value , pp 2055-2076
- Dov Monderer and Dov Samet
- Ch 55 Values of non-transferable utility games , pp 2077-2120
- Richard McLean
- Ch 56 Values of games with infinitely many players , pp 2121-2167
- Abraham Neyman
- Ch 57 Values of perfectly competitive economies , pp 2169-2184
- Sergiu Hart
- Ch 58 Some other economic applications of the value , pp 2185-2201
- Jean-François Mertens
- Ch 59 Strategic aspects of political systems , pp 2203-2228
- Jeffrey Banks
- Ch 60 Game-theoretic analysis of legal rules and institutions , pp 2229-2269
- Jean-Pierre Benoit and Lewis A. Kornhauser
- Ch 61 Implementation theory , pp 2271-2326
- Thomas Palfrey
- Ch 62 Game theory and experimental gaming , pp 2327-2351
- Martin Shubik
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