Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications

Current editor(s): R.J. Aumann and S. Hart

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Ch 01 The game of chess , pp 1-17: Herbert Simon and Jonathan Schaeffer
Ch 1 Rationality , pp 1-26: Ken Binmore
Ch 2 Advances in Zero-Sum Dynamic Games , pp 27-93: Rida Laraki and Sylvain Sori
Ch 02 Games in extensive and strategic forms , pp 19-40: Sergiu Hart
Ch 03 Games with perfect information , pp 41-70: Jan Mycielski
Ch 3 Games on Networks , pp 95-163: Matthew Jackson and Yves Zenou
Ch 4 Reputations in Repeated Games , pp 165-238: George Mailath and Larry Samuelson
Ch 04 Repeated games with complete information , pp 71-107: Sylvain Sorin
Ch 05 Repeated games of incomplete information: Zero-sum , pp 109-154: Shmuel Zamir
Ch 5 Coalition Formation , pp 239-326: Debraj Ray and Rajiv Vohra
Ch 06 Repeated games of incomplete information: Non-zero-sum , pp 155-177: Francoise Forges
Ch 6 Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics , pp 327-380: Chris Wallace and H. Peyton Young
Ch 07 Noncooperative models of bargaining , pp 179-225: Ken Binmore, Martin Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein
Ch 7 Advances in Auctions , pp 381-453: Todd Kaplan and Shmuel Zamir
Ch 8 Combinatorial Auctions , pp 455-476: Rakesh V. Vohra
Ch 08 Strategic analysis of auctions , pp 227-279: Robert Wilson
Ch 9 Algorithmic Mechanism Design , pp 477-515: Noam Nisan
Ch 09 Location , pp 281-304: Jean Gabszewicz and Jacques Thisse
Ch 10 Strategic models of entry deterrence , pp 305-329: Robert Wilson
Ch 10 Behavioral Game Theory Experiments and Modeling , pp 517-573: Colin F. Camerer and Teck-Hua Ho
Ch 11 Patent licensing , pp 331-354: Morton I. Kamien
Ch 11 Evolutionary Game Theory in Biology , pp 575-617: Peter Hammerstein and Olof Leimar
Ch 12 Epistemic Game Theory , pp 619-702: Eddie Dekel and Marciano Siniscalchi
Ch 12 The core and balancedness , pp 355-395: Yakar Kannai
Ch 13 Axiomatizations of the core , pp 397-412: Bezalel Peleg
Ch 13 Population Games and Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics , pp 703-778: William Sandholm
Ch 14 The core in perfectly competitive economies , pp 413-457: Robert M. Anderson
Ch 14 The Complexity of Computing Equilibria , pp 779-810: Christos Papadimitriou
Ch 15 The core in imperfectly competitive economies , pp 459-483: Jean Gabszewicz and Benyamin Shitovitz
Ch 15 Theory of Combinatorial Games , pp 811-859: Aviezri S. Fraenkel, Robert A. Hearn and Aaron N. Siegel
Ch 16 Two-sided matching , pp 485-541: Alvin Roth and Marilda Sotomayor
Ch 16 Game Theory and Distributed Control , pp 861-899: Jason R. Marden and Jeff S. Shamma
Ch 17 Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets , pp 543-590: William Lucas
Ch 17 Ambiguity and Nonexpected Utility , pp 901-947: Edi Kami, Fabio Maccheroni and Massimo Marinacci
Ch 18 Calibration and Expert Testing , pp 949-984: Wojciech Olszewski
Ch 18 The bargaining set, kernel, and nucleolus , pp 591-667: Michael Maschler
Ch 19 Game and decision theoretic models in ethics , pp 669-707: John Harsanyi
Ch 20 Zero-sum two-person games , pp 735-768: T.E.S. Raghavan
Ch 21 Game theory and statistics , pp 769-779: Gideon Schwarz
Ch 22 Differential games , pp 781-799: Avner Friedman
Ch 23 Differential games -- Economic applications , pp 801-825: Simone Clemhout and Henry Wan
Ch 24 Communication, correlated equilibria and incentive compatibility , pp 827-847: Roger Myerson
Ch 25 Signalling , pp 849-867: David Kreps and Joel Sobel
Ch 26 Moral hazard , pp 869-903: Prajit K. Dutta and Roy Radner
Ch 27 Search , pp 905-927: John McMillan and Michael Rothschild
Ch 28 Game theory and evolutionary biology , pp 929-993: Peter Hammerstein and Reinhard Selten
Ch 29 Game theory models of peace and war , pp 995-1053: Barry O'Neill
Ch 30 Voting procedures , pp 1055-1089: Steven Brams
Ch 31 Social choice , pp 1091-1125: Herve Moulin
Ch 32 Power and stability in politics , pp 1127-1151: Philip Straffin