Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?

Gary Charness and Peter Kuhn

Chapter 03 in Handbook of Labor Economics, 2011, vol. 4A, pp 229-330 from Elsevier

Abstract: This chapter surveys the contributions of laboratory experiments to labor economics. We begin with a discussion of methodological issues: when (and why) is a lab experiment the best approach; how do laboratory experiments compare to field experiments; and what are the main design issues? We then summarize the substantive contributions of laboratory experiments to our understanding of principal-agent interactions, social preferences, union-firm bargaining, arbitration, gender differentials, discrimination, job search, and labor markets more generally.

Keywords: Laboratory experiment; Social preferences; Principal-agent models; Personnel economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
ISBN: 978-0-444-53450-7
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (242)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab? (2010)
Working Paper: Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab? (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:labchp:4-03

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