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Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare
Current editor(s): K. J. Arrow, A. K. Sen and K. Suzumura From Elsevier
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- Ch 01 Impossibility theorems in the arrovian framework , pp 35-94
- Donald E. Campbell and Jerry S. Kelly
- Ch 02 Categories of arrovian voting schemes , pp 95-129
- Fuad Aleskerov
- Ch 03 Domain restrictions , pp 131-170
- Wulf Gaertner
- Ch 04 Voting procedures , pp 173-236
- Steven Brams and Peter C. Fishburn
- Ch 05 Implementation theory , pp 237-288
- Eric Maskin and Tomas Sjostrom
- Ch 06 Axiomatic cost and surplus sharing , pp 289-357
- Herve Moulin
- Ch 07 Positional rules of collective decision-making , pp 361-394
- Prasanta K. Pattanaik
- Ch 08 Game-theoretic analysis of voting in committees , pp 395-423
- Bezalel Peleg
- Ch 09 Representative democracy as social choice , pp 425-455
- Norman Schofield
- Ch 10 Social welfare functionals and interpersonal comparability , pp 459-541
- Claude d'Aspremont and Louis Gevers
- Ch 11 Utilitarianism and the theory of justice , pp 543-596
- Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert and David Donaldson
- Ch 12 Chapter 12 Inequality, poverty and welfare , pp 597-633
- Bhaskar Dutta
- Ch 13 Chapter Thirteen - Kenneth Arrow on Social Choice Theory , pp 3-27
- Kenneth Arrow, Amartya Sen and Kotaro Suzumura
- Ch 14 Chapter Fourteen - The Informational Basis of Social Choiceprotect , pp 29-46
- Amartya Sen
- Ch 15 Chapter Fifteen - Competitive Market Mechanisms as Social Choice Procedures , pp 47-151
- Peter Hammond
- Ch 16 Chapter Sixteen - Functionings and Capabilities , pp 153-187
- Kaushik Basu and Luis Lopez-Calva
- Ch 17 Chapter Seventeen - Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains , pp 191-299
- Michel Le Breton and John Weymark
- Ch 18 Chapter Eighteen - Topological Theories of Social Choice , pp 301-334
- Nicholas Baigent
- Ch 19 Chapter Nineteen - Nonbinary Social Choice , pp 335-366
- Rajat Deb
- Ch 20 Chapter Twenty - Social Choice with Fuzzy Preferences , pp 367-389
- Barrett Richard and Maurice Salles
- Ch 21 Chapter Twenty-One - Fair Allocation Rules , pp 393-506
- William Thomson
- Ch 22 Chapter Twenty-Two - Compensation and Responsibilityprotect , pp 507-604
- Marc Fleurbaey and Francois Maniquet
- Ch 23 Chapter Twenty-Three - Welfarism, Individual Rights, and Procedural Fairness , pp 605-685
- Kotaro Suzumura
- Ch 24 Chapter Twenty-Four - Freedom, Opportunity, and Well-Being , pp 687-728
- James Foster
- Ch 25 Chapter Twenty-Five - Strategyproof Social Choice , pp 731-831
- Salvador Barberà
- Ch 26 Chapter Twenty-Six - Probabilistic and Spatial Models of Voting , pp 833-896
- Peter Coughlin
- Ch 27 Chapter Twenty-Seven - Geometry of Voting , pp 897-945
- Donald G. Saari
- Ch Preface Preface , pp xvii-xviii
- Kenneth Arrow, A. K. Sen and Kotaro Suzumura
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