Relative Performance Evaluation, Agent Hold-up and Firm Organization

Ola Kvaløy and Trond Olsen

A chapter in Organizational Innovation and Firm Performance, 2008, pp 229-241 from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Date: 2008
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