Sanctions, Evasion, and Deterrence: Evidence from Speeding Enforcement
Romain Gauriot and
Maria Wisniewska
Papers from arXiv.org
Abstract:
The design of sanctions plays a central role in shaping reoffending behavior. We study the effects of fixed monetary fines and accumulating penalty points on speeding recidivism and liability transfer. Exploiting a large increase in sanctions in Queensland, Australia, we estimate the causal effects of these sanctions on subsequent offending and nomination of other drivers. Higher demerit points increase fine renomination, consistent with strategic blame shifting. Estimated reductions in reoffending are small among offenders facing higher fines alone. Reoffending falls by a substantial 4.6 percentage points when higher fines are accompanied by additional penalty points.
Date: 2026-11
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2611.09337 Latest version (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2611.09337
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().