Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers

From Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University
Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Bettina Weingarten ().

Access Statistics for this working paper series.
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.

335: Centralized common pool management and local community participation

Jana Vyrastekova and Daan van Soest

334: Self-supporting liberals and their cliques: an axiomatic characterization

Dinko Dimitrov and Yongsheng Xu

333: Social choice and just institutions: new perspectives

Marc Fleurbaey

332: Convex fuzzy games and participation monotonic allocation schemes

Rodica Brânzei, Dinko Dimitrov and Stef Tijs

331: Hypercubes and compromise values for cooperative fuzzy games

Rodica Brânzei, Dinko Dimitrov and Stef Tijs

330: Moral property rights in bargaining

Simon Gächter and Arno Riedl

329: NTU prenucleoli

Sven Klauke

328: The Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering: a defence

Marc Fleurbaey

327: Antagonistic properties and n-person games

Jean-Pierre Beaud

326: The positive core of a cooperative game

Gooni Orshan and Peter Sudhölter

325: Reconfirming the prenucleolus

Gooni Orshan and Peter Sudhölter

324: The dummy paradox of the bargaining set

Bezalel Peleg and Peter Sudhölter

323: A note on an axiomatization of the core of market games

Peter Sudhölter and Bezalel Peleg

322: Can and should the Nash Program be looked at as a part of mechanism theory

Walter Trockel

321: Game theory

Joachim Rosenmüller and Walter Trockel

320: Cartels via the modiclus

Joachim Rosenmüller and Peter Sudhölter

319: Formation of cartels in glove markets and the modiclus

Joachim Rosenmüller and Peter Sudhölter

318: The endogenous formation of cartels

Joachim Rosenmüller

317: Experimental evidence for attractions to chance

Wulf Albers, Robin Pope, Reinhard Selten and Bodo Vogt

316: The minimal quota for a complete and transitive majority relation

Laurent Vidu

315: Full information, hidden action and hidden information in principal agent games

Bodo Vogt

314: Symmetric homogeneous local interaction

Axel Ostmann and Martha Saboyá

313: The semireactive bargaining set of a cooperative game

Peter Sudhölter and Jos Potters

312: Do monopolies justifiably fear environmental tax reforms

Thorsten Bayındır-Upmann

311: Bidding for envy freeness

Claus-Jochen Haake, Matthias G. Raith and Francis Edward Su

310: A universal meta bargaining realization of the Nash solution

Walter Trockel

309: Strategic environmental trade policy under free entry of firms

Thorsten Bayındır-Upmann

308: Unique Nash implementation for a class of bargaining solutions

Walter Trockel

307: Some classes of potential and semi-potential games

Nikolai Kukushkin

306: On the Nash program for the Nash bargaining solution

Walter Trockel

305: Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory

Walter Trockel

304: Should high tax countries pursue revenue neutral ecological tax reform?

Thorsten Bayındır-Upmann and Matthias Raith

303: Mechanisms in the core of a fee game

Joachim Rosenmüller

302: A characterization of vNM stable sets for linear production games

Joachim Rosenmüller and Benyamin Shitovitz

301: Implementation of the Kalai Smorodinski bargaining solution in dominant strategies

Claus-Jochen Haake

300: Fair negotiation procedures

Matthias G. Raith

299: Supporting cooperative multi-issue negotiations

Matthias G. Raith

298: ARTUS: the Adaptable Round Table with a User Specific Surface

Matthias G. Raith and Helge Wilker

297: An axiomatization of the core

Yan-An Hwang and Peter Sudhölter

296: Symmetries of games with public and private objectives

Nikolai Kukushkin

295: Adjusted winner

Matthias G. Raith and Andreas Welzel

294: Systems of decreasing reactions and their fixed points

Nikolaj SerafimoviÄ KukuÅ¡kin

293: Large totally balanced games

Joachim Rosenmüller

292: The positive prekernel of a cooperative game

Bezalel Peleg and Peter Sudhölter

291: Rationalizability of the Nash bargaining solution

Walter Trockel

290: Single peakedness and coalition proofness

Bezalel Peleg and Peter Sudhölter

289: An algorithm for incentive compatible mechanisms of fee games

Elvira Thelichmann

288: The complexity of a number as a quantitative predictor of the frequency of responses under decimal perception

Wulf Albers

287: A model of the concession behavior in the sequence of offers of the German electronic stock exchange trading market (IBIS) based on the prominence structure of the bid ask spread

Wulf Albers, Andreas Uphaus and Bodo Vogt

286: The boundedly rational decision process creating probability responses empirical results confirming the theory of prominence

Wulf Albers and Andreas Güntzel