Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers
From Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University
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- 313: The semireactive bargaining set of a cooperative game

- Peter Sudhölter and Jos Potters
- 312: Do monopolies justifiably fear environmental tax reforms

- Thorsten Bayındır-Upmann
- 311: Bidding for envy freeness

- Claus-Jochen Haake, Matthias G. Raith and Francis Edward Su
- 310: A universal meta bargaining realization of the Nash solution

- Walter Trockel
- 309: Strategic environmental trade policy under free entry of firms

- Thorsten Bayındır-Upmann
- 308: Unique Nash implementation for a class of bargaining solutions

- Walter Trockel
- 307: Some classes of potential and semi-potential games

- Nikolai Kukushkin
- 306: On the Nash program for the Nash bargaining solution

- Walter Trockel
- 305: Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory

- Walter Trockel
- 304: Should high tax countries pursue revenue neutral ecological tax reform?

- Thorsten Bayındır-Upmann and Matthias Raith
- 303: Mechanisms in the core of a fee game

- Joachim Rosenmüller
- 302: A characterization of vNM stable sets for linear production games

- Joachim Rosenmüller and Benyamin Shitovitz
- 301: Implementation of the Kalai Smorodinski bargaining solution in dominant strategies

- Claus-Jochen Haake
- 300: Fair negotiation procedures

- Matthias G. Raith
- 299: Supporting cooperative multi-issue negotiations

- Matthias G. Raith
- 298: ARTUS: the Adaptable Round Table with a User Specific Surface

- Matthias G. Raith and Helge Wilker
- 297: An axiomatization of the core

- Yan-An Hwang and Peter Sudhölter
- 296: Symmetries of games with public and private objectives

- Nikolai Kukushkin
- 295: Adjusted winner

- Matthias G. Raith and Andreas Welzel
- 294: Systems of decreasing reactions and their fixed points

- Nikolaj SerafimoviÄ KukuÅ¡kin
- 293: Large totally balanced games

- Joachim Rosenmüller
- 292: The positive prekernel of a cooperative game

- Bezalel Peleg and Peter Sudhölter
- 291: Rationalizability of the Nash bargaining solution

- Walter Trockel
- 290: Single peakedness and coalition proofness

- Bezalel Peleg and Peter Sudhölter
- 289: An algorithm for incentive compatible mechanisms of fee games

- Elvira Thelichmann
- 288: The complexity of a number as a quantitative predictor of the frequency of responses under decimal perception

- Wulf Albers
- 287: A model of the concession behavior in the sequence of offers of the German electronic stock exchange trading market (IBIS) based on the prominence structure of the bid ask spread

- Wulf Albers, Andreas Uphaus and Bodo Vogt
- 286: The boundedly rational decision process creating probability responses empirical results confirming the theory of prominence

- Wulf Albers and Andreas Güntzel
- 285: Cash equivalent versus market value

- Wulf Albers
- 284: Evaluation of lotteries with two alternatives by the theory of prominence

- Wulf Albers
- 283: Connection between ultimatum behavior and reciprocity in a combined ultimatum reciprocity game

- Bodo Vogt
- 282: The price response function and logarithmic perception of prices and quantities

- Fred Fegel, Bodo Vogt and Wulf Albers
- 281: Criteria for fair divisions in ultimatum games

- Bodo Vogt
- 280: Stock price clustering and numerical perception

- Andreas Uphaus, Bodo Vogt and Wulf Albers
- 279: The strength of reciprocity in a reciprocity game

- Bodo Vogt
- 278: Reference functions and solutions to bargaining problems with claims

- Anke Gerber
- 277: The averaging mechanism

- Elisabeth Naeve-Steinweg
- 276: The Nash bargaining solution is Nash implementable

- Jörg Naeve
- 275: On the value of discounted stochastic games

- Jean-Michel Coulomb
- 274: Environmental taxation and the double dividend: a drawback for a revenue-neutral tax reform

- Thorsten Bayındır-Upmann and Matthias G. Raith
- 273: An extension of the Raiffa Kalai Smorodinsky solution to bargaining problems with claims

- Anke Gerber
- 272: Selection between pareto-optimal outcomes in 2-person bargaining

- Bodo Vogt and Wulf Albers
- 271: Foundations of a theory of prominence in the decimal system. Part V: Operations on scales, and evaluation of prospects

- Wulf Albers
- 270: Foundations of a theory of prominence in the decimal system. Part IV: Task dependence of smallest received money units, nonexistence of general utility functions, and related paradoxa

- Wulf Albers
- 269: Foundations of a theory of prominence in the decimal system. Part III: Perception of numerical information, and relations to traditional solution concepts

- Wulf Albers
- 268: The selection of mixed strategies in 2 x 2 bimatrix games

- Wulf Albers and Bodo Vogt
- 267: Equilibrium selection in 2 x 2 bimatrix games with preplay communication

- Bodo Vogt and Wulf Albers
- 266: Foundations of a theory of prominence in the decimal system. Part II: Exactness selection rule, and confirming results

- Wulf Albers, Eike Albers, Leif Albers and Bodo Vogt
- 265: Foundations of a theory of prominence in the decimal system. Part I: Numerical response as a process, exactness, scales, and structure of scales

- Wulf Albers
- 264: Coalition formation in general NTU games

- Anke Gerber