Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers

From Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University
Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Bettina Weingarten ().

Access Statistics for this working paper series.
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.

313: The semireactive bargaining set of a cooperative game

Peter Sudhölter and Jos Potters

312: Do monopolies justifiably fear environmental tax reforms

Thorsten Bayındır-Upmann

311: Bidding for envy freeness

Claus-Jochen Haake, Matthias G. Raith and Francis Edward Su

310: A universal meta bargaining realization of the Nash solution

Walter Trockel

309: Strategic environmental trade policy under free entry of firms

Thorsten Bayındır-Upmann

308: Unique Nash implementation for a class of bargaining solutions

Walter Trockel

307: Some classes of potential and semi-potential games

Nikolai Kukushkin

306: On the Nash program for the Nash bargaining solution

Walter Trockel

305: Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory

Walter Trockel

304: Should high tax countries pursue revenue neutral ecological tax reform?

Thorsten Bayındır-Upmann and Matthias Raith

303: Mechanisms in the core of a fee game

Joachim Rosenmüller

302: A characterization of vNM stable sets for linear production games

Joachim Rosenmüller and Benyamin Shitovitz

301: Implementation of the Kalai Smorodinski bargaining solution in dominant strategies

Claus-Jochen Haake

300: Fair negotiation procedures

Matthias G. Raith

299: Supporting cooperative multi-issue negotiations

Matthias G. Raith

298: ARTUS: the Adaptable Round Table with a User Specific Surface

Matthias G. Raith and Helge Wilker

297: An axiomatization of the core

Yan-An Hwang and Peter Sudhölter

296: Symmetries of games with public and private objectives

Nikolai Kukushkin

295: Adjusted winner

Matthias G. Raith and Andreas Welzel

294: Systems of decreasing reactions and their fixed points

Nikolaj SerafimoviÄ KukuÅ¡kin

293: Large totally balanced games

Joachim Rosenmüller

292: The positive prekernel of a cooperative game

Bezalel Peleg and Peter Sudhölter

291: Rationalizability of the Nash bargaining solution

Walter Trockel

290: Single peakedness and coalition proofness

Bezalel Peleg and Peter Sudhölter

289: An algorithm for incentive compatible mechanisms of fee games

Elvira Thelichmann

288: The complexity of a number as a quantitative predictor of the frequency of responses under decimal perception

Wulf Albers

287: A model of the concession behavior in the sequence of offers of the German electronic stock exchange trading market (IBIS) based on the prominence structure of the bid ask spread

Wulf Albers, Andreas Uphaus and Bodo Vogt

286: The boundedly rational decision process creating probability responses empirical results confirming the theory of prominence

Wulf Albers and Andreas Güntzel

285: Cash equivalent versus market value

Wulf Albers

284: Evaluation of lotteries with two alternatives by the theory of prominence

Wulf Albers

283: Connection between ultimatum behavior and reciprocity in a combined ultimatum reciprocity game

Bodo Vogt

282: The price response function and logarithmic perception of prices and quantities

Fred Fegel, Bodo Vogt and Wulf Albers

281: Criteria for fair divisions in ultimatum games

Bodo Vogt

280: Stock price clustering and numerical perception

Andreas Uphaus, Bodo Vogt and Wulf Albers

279: The strength of reciprocity in a reciprocity game

Bodo Vogt

278: Reference functions and solutions to bargaining problems with claims

Anke Gerber

277: The averaging mechanism

Elisabeth Naeve-Steinweg

276: The Nash bargaining solution is Nash implementable

Jörg Naeve

275: On the value of discounted stochastic games

Jean-Michel Coulomb

274: Environmental taxation and the double dividend: a drawback for a revenue-neutral tax reform

Thorsten Bayındır-Upmann and Matthias G. Raith

273: An extension of the Raiffa Kalai Smorodinsky solution to bargaining problems with claims

Anke Gerber

272: Selection between pareto-optimal outcomes in 2-person bargaining

Bodo Vogt and Wulf Albers

271: Foundations of a theory of prominence in the decimal system. Part V: Operations on scales, and evaluation of prospects

Wulf Albers

270: Foundations of a theory of prominence in the decimal system. Part IV: Task dependence of smallest received money units, nonexistence of general utility functions, and related paradoxa

Wulf Albers

269: Foundations of a theory of prominence in the decimal system. Part III: Perception of numerical information, and relations to traditional solution concepts

Wulf Albers

268: The selection of mixed strategies in 2 x 2 bimatrix games

Wulf Albers and Bodo Vogt

267: Equilibrium selection in 2 x 2 bimatrix games with preplay communication

Bodo Vogt and Wulf Albers

266: Foundations of a theory of prominence in the decimal system. Part II: Exactness selection rule, and confirming results

Wulf Albers, Eike Albers, Leif Albers and Bodo Vogt

265: Foundations of a theory of prominence in the decimal system. Part I: Numerical response as a process, exactness, scales, and structure of scales

Wulf Albers

264: Coalition formation in general NTU games

Anke Gerber