Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers

From Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University
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235: On the existence of equilibrium in hierarchically structured economies

Willy Spanjers

234: Green taxes in oligopoly revisited: exogenous versus endogenous number of firms

Till Requate

233: Excessive and under-investment: on the incentives to adopt new technologies under Pigouvian taxes and tradeable permits

Till Requate

232: Solution concepts for c-convex, assignment, and m2-games

Peter Sudhölter

231: A Walrasian approach to bargaining games

Walter Trockel

230: An axiomatisation of Nash equilibria in economic situations

Bezalel Peleg and Peter Sudhölter

229: Endogenous structures of trade relationships in hierarchically structured economies with bid and ask prices and two commodities

Willy Spanjers

228: Bargaining with incomplete information: an axiomatic approach

Joachim Rosenmüller

227: Concave utility and individual demand

Yakar Kannai

226: Arbitrage and monopolistic market structures

Willy Spanjers

225: Bid and ask prices in hierarchically structured economies with two commodities

Willy Spanjers

224: Arbitrage and Walrasian equilibrium in hierarchically structured economies

Willy Spanjers

223: Population and environmental quality

Mark B. Cronshaw and Till Requate

222: Incentives to innovate under emission taxes and tradeable permits

Till Requate

221: Entwurf zur Verbesserung der Lenkungseffizienz der Selbstbeteiligung in der GKV am Beispiel Zahnersatz. Der Proportionaltarif mit differenziertem Selbstbehalt

Walter Winkler

220: Independence for characterizing axioms of the pre-nucleolus

Peter Sudhölter

219: Equivalence of effluent taxes and permits for environmental regulation of several local monopolies

Till Requate

218: A mathematical note on the structure of SYMLOG directions

Dieter Betten and Axel Ostmann

217: Incentives in market games with asymmetric information: approximate (NTU) cores in large economies

Beth Allen

216: Pollution control under imperfect competition: asymmetric Bertrand oligopoly with linear technologies

Till Requate

215: Representation of CII-Games and the expected contract value

Joachim Rosenmüller

214: Zur Prominenzstruktur von Zahlenangaben bei diffuser numerischer Information. Ein Experiment mit kontrolliertem Grad der Diffusität

Bodo Vogt and Wulf Albers

213: Star shapedness of the kernel for homogeneous games and application to weighted majority games

Peter Sudhölter

212: Pollution control under imperfect competition via taxes or permits: Cournot Duopoly

Till Requate

211: Incentives in market games with asymmetric information

Beth Allen

210: Permits or taxes? How to regulate Cournot Duopoly with polluting firms

Till Requate

209: The kernel of homogeneous games with steps

Bezalel Peleg, Joachim Rosenmüller and Peter Sudhölter

208: Incentive compatible cost allocation schemes

David Schmeidler and Yair Tauman

207: Linear representability without completeness and transitivity

Walter Trockel

206: Central bank policy under strategic wage setting

Volker Bieta

205: Robust implementation under alternative information structures

Luis C. Corchón and Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín

204: Nash equilibria of informational extensions

Nikolaj SerafimoviÄ KukuÅ¡kin

203: On existence of stable and efficient outcomes in games with public and private objectives

Nikolaj SerafimoviÄ KukuÅ¡kin

202: The nucleolus of homogeneous games with steps

Joachim Rosenmüller and Peter Sudhölter

201: Informationsverarbeitungsstrukturen in begrenzt rationalen komplexen individuellen Entscheidungen

Andrea Brunwinkel

200: On the value of having the decision on the outcome of others

Wulf Albers and Shmuel Zamir

199: Implementing demand equilibria as stable states of a revealed demand approach

Wulf Albers and James D. Laing

198: Wage formation and credibility

Volker Bieta and Martin Straub

197: An alternative proof for the linear utility representation theorem

Walter Trockel

195: Directed and weighted majority games

Ingomar Krohn and Peter Sudhölter

194: Dynamic Bertrand Edgeworth competition with entry, exit decisions

Till Requate

193: The least core, nucleolus, and kernel of homogeneous weighted majority games

Joachim Rosenmüller and Bezalel Peleg

192: Repeated Bertrand Edgeworth competition with increasing marginal costs

Till Requate

191: Eine spieltheoretische Variante des Maximum-Prinzips

Nikolaj N. Vorobʹev

190: Fee games: (N)TU-games with incomplete information

Joachim Rosenmüller

189: Die Ausgestaltung von Geldpolitiken unter dem Einfluß eines Kontrollfehlers beim Geldangebotsprozeß der Zentralbank

Volker Bieta

188: Sources of prominence in computer aided experimental spatial games

Wulf Albers and James D. Laing

187: A bargaining problem with transferable utility

Frank Weidner

186: Informationsstrukturen als Determinanten für den Erfolg von Geldpolitiken und die Bedeutung der Ausgestaltung der institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen in einer Ökonomie

Volker Bieta

185: Domination, core and solution

Olga Bondareva