Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers

From Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University
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213: Star shapedness of the kernel for homogeneous games and application to weighted majority games

Peter Sudhölter

212: Pollution control under imperfect competition via taxes or permits: Cournot Duopoly

Till Requate

211: Incentives in market games with asymmetric information

Beth Allen

210: Permits or taxes? How to regulate Cournot Duopoly with polluting firms

Till Requate

209: The kernel of homogeneous games with steps

Bezalel Peleg, Joachim Rosenmüller and Peter Sudhölter

208: Incentive compatible cost allocation schemes

David Schmeidler and Yair Tauman

207: Linear representability without completeness and transitivity

Walter Trockel

206: Central bank policy under strategic wage setting

Volker Bieta

205: Robust implementation under alternative information structures

Luis Corchon and Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín

204: Nash equilibria of informational extensions

Nikolaj Serafimovič Kukuškin

203: On existence of stable and efficient outcomes in games with public and private objectives

Nikolaj Serafimovič Kukuškin

202: The nucleolus of homogeneous games with steps

Joachim Rosenmüller and Peter Sudhölter

201: Informationsverarbeitungsstrukturen in begrenzt rationalen komplexen individuellen Entscheidungen

Andrea Brunwinkel

200: On the value of having the decision on the outcome of others

Wulf Albers and Shmuel Zamir

199: Implementing demand equilibria as stable states of a revealed demand approach

Wulf Albers and James D. Laing

198: Wage formation and credibility

Volker Bieta and Martin Straub

197: An alternative proof for the linear utility representation theorem

Walter Trockel

195: Directed and weighted majority games

Ingomar Krohn and Peter Sudhölter

194: Dynamic Bertrand Edgeworth competition with entry, exit decisions

Till Requate

193: The least core, nucleolus, and kernel of homogeneous weighted majority games

Joachim Rosenmüller and Bezalel Peleg

192: Repeated Bertrand Edgeworth competition with increasing marginal costs

Till Requate

191: Eine spieltheoretische Variante des Maximum-Prinzips

Nikolaj N. Vorobʹev

190: Fee games: (N)TU-games with incomplete information

Joachim Rosenmüller

189: Die Ausgestaltung von Geldpolitiken unter dem Einfluß eines Kontrollfehlers beim Geldangebotsprozeß der Zentralbank

Volker Bieta

188: Sources of prominence in computer aided experimental spatial games

Wulf Albers and James D. Laing

187: A bargaining problem with transferable utility

Frank Weidner

186: Informationsstrukturen als Determinanten für den Erfolg von Geldpolitiken und die Bedeutung der Ausgestaltung der institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen in einer Ökonomie

Volker Bieta

185: Domination, core and solution

Olga Bondareva

184: Fusionen: ein einfaches Spiel als Beispiel sowie eine neue Charakterisierung des Banzhafwertes

Axel Ostmann

183: Revealed fuzzy preferences

Olga Bondareva

182: On optimal strategies in repeated zero-sum games with lack of information on one side

Martin Heuer

181: Präferenzoffenbarung wirtschaftspolitischer Entscheidungsträger als Element der ¬Pollitikgestaltung [Politikgestaltung] im Kontext der asymmetrischen Information

Volker Bieta

180: On the Harsanyi-Selten value

Frank Weidner

179: Implementing the modified LH-algorithm

Ingomar Krohn, S. Moltzahn, Joachim Rosenmüller, Peter Sudhölter and H.-M. Wallmeier

178: Wirtschaftspolitiken bei asymmetrischer Information als Resultat der "incentive" Struktur einer Politikinstanz, eine Steuerung der Ökonomie durch "pooling equilibria" oder "separating equilibria"

Volker Bieta

177: A multi-person approach towards the maximization of the average rate of return

Hans-Martin Wallmeier

176: The nucleolus of a game without side payments

Olga Bondareva

175: Nash implementation with renegotiation in the case of two agents

Detlev Homann

174: Asymptotically optimal strategies in repeated zero-sum games with incomplete information

Martina Heuermann

173: Ãœber Informationsprobleme bei der Implementation von Mechanismen

Walter Trockel

172: Homogeneous games as anti step functions

Peter Sudhölter

170: Incomplete contracts and Nash implementation in the case of two agents

Detlev Homann

169: Simple games: on order and symmetry

Axel Ostmann

168: A multi-person approach towards the maximization of the average rate of return

Hans-Martin Wallmeier

167: A contribution to the macro theory of comparative economic systems

Tatsuro Ichiishi

166: Remarks on cooperative games with incomplete information

Joachim Rosenmüller

165: Comparative cooperative game theory

Tatsuro Ichiishi

164: Theorems on closed coverings of a simplex and their applications to cooperative game theory

Tatsuro Ichiishi and Adam Idzik

163: A discrete approach to general equilibrium and NTU-games

Joachim Rosenmüller

162: Uniqueness of individual demand at almost every budget via Sard's theorem

Walter Trockel