Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers
From Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University
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- 147: Statistically varying K-person games with incomplete information
- Hans-Martin Wallmeier
- 146: Games and incomplete information. A survey: Part I
- Hans-Martin Wallmeier
- 145: Two-person bargaining between threat and fair solution
- Wulf Albers
- 144: Construction of homogeneous zero-sum games
- Peter Sudhölter
- 143: Homogeneous games with countably many players
- Joachim Rosenmüller
- 142: Discrimination of equally sized subsets for discrete, memoryless channels
- Hans-Martin Wallmeier
- 141: Für Abhängige keinen Zugewinn?
- Axel Ostmann
- 140: Classifying three person games
- Axel Ostmann
- 139: Empirische Analyse der Minimaldarstellung von Parlamenten
- Volker Bieta
- 138: Homogeneous games: recursive structure and computation
- Joachim Rosenmüller
- 137: The structure of homogeneous games
- Joachim Rosenmüller
- 136: A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Chapter 7: a bargaining problem with transaction costs on one side
- Reinhard Selten
- 135: Homogeneous games with countably many players
- Joachim Rosenmüller
- 134: Statistically varying games with incomplete information
- Hans-Martin Wallmeier
- 133: Geordnete einfache Spiele
- Axel Ostmann
- 132: A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Chapter 5: The solution concept
- John Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten
- 131: The biological counterpart to non-cooperative game theory
- Peter Hammerstein
- 130: Institutional utilitarianism
- Reinhard Selten
- 129: Are cartel laws bad for business
- Reinhard Selten
- 128: Weighted majority games and the matrix of homogeneity
- Joachim Rosenmüller
- 127: Wahlen, Repraesentation und der Mechanismus des Proporzes
- Axel Ostmann
- 126: Kernel and core of replicated market games
- Ulrich Klein
- 125: On the prominence structure of the decimal system
- Wulf Albers and Gisela Albers
- 124: On the minimal representation of homogeneous games
- Axel Ostmann
- 123: End behavior in sequences of finite prisoner's dilemma supergames
- Reinhard Selten and Rolf Stoecker
- 122: Evolutionary stability in extensive 2-person games. Sections 10 to 12
- Reinhard Selten
- 121: Evolutionary stability in extensive 2-person games. Sections 1 to 9
- Reinhard Selten
- 120: Game theory in the ecological context
- Susan E. Riechert and Peter Hammerstein
- 119: Equal division payoff bounds for 3-person characteristic function experiments
- Reinhard Selten
- 118: Comparison of two theories for characteristic function experiments
- Reinhard Selten and Wilhelm Krischker
- 117: Elementary theory of slack ridden imperfect competition
- Reinhard Selten
- 116: Ein Zugang zu Differentialspielen
- Axel Ostmann
- 115: On homogeneous weights for simple games
- Joachim Rosenmüller
- 114: A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Chapter 3: Consequence of desirable properties
- John Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten
- 113: Original oder Fälschung: Gleichgewichtsauswahl in einem Verhandlungsspiel mit unvollständiger Information
- Reinhard Selten and Werner Güth
- 112: Cu mi lernu esperanton
- Reinhard Selten and Jonathan Pool
- 111: Equal division kernel and referenc coalitions in three-person games
- Helmut W. Crott, Roland W. Scholz and Wulf Albers
- 110: Formale Konzepte eingeschränkt rationalen Verhaltens
- Angela Klopstech and Reinhard Selten
- 109: The asymmetric war of attrition
- Peter Hammerstein and Geoffrey A. Parker
- 108: From ability to pay to concepts of equal sacrifice
- Wolfram Richter
- 107: Projekt Standortspiele. 2. Bericht
- Wulf Albers, G. Huttel, A. Ostmann, Wolfram Richter, Joachim Rosenmüller, M. Straub and H.-M. Wallmeier
- 106: A normative justification of progressive taxation: how to compromise on Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky
- Wolfram Richter
- 105: A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Chapter 2: Games in standard form
- John Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten
- 104: Das erlernte Schlußverhalten, eine experimentelle Untersuchung
- Rolf Stoecker
- 103: LP games with sufficiently many players
- Joachim Rosenmüller
- 102: On income tax functions
- Wolfram Richter and J. Felix Hampe
- 101: The partially pegging exchange rate problem: a three-country model
- John-ren Chen
- 100: The effects of the partially pegging exchange rate policy in a small economy
- John-ren Chen
- 99: Der Kern fuer n-Personen-Einfache-Produktionsspiele
- Hans-Martin Wallmeier
- 98: The equal division kernel: an equitiy approach to coalition formation and payoff distribution in n-person games
- Helmut W. Crott and Wulf Albers
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