Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers
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- 221: Entwurf zur Verbesserung der Lenkungseffizienz der Selbstbeteiligung in der GKV am Beispiel Zahnersatz. Der Proportionaltarif mit differenziertem Selbstbehalt

- Walter Winkler
- 220: Independence for characterizing axioms of the pre-nucleolus

- Peter Sudhölter
- 219: Equivalence of effluent taxes and permits for environmental regulation of several local monopolies

- Till Requate
- 218: A mathematical note on the structure of SYMLOG directions

- Dieter Betten and Axel Ostmann
- 217: Incentives in market games with asymmetric information: approximate (NTU) cores in large economies

- Beth Allen
- 216: Pollution control under imperfect competition: asymmetric Bertrand oligopoly with linear technologies

- Till Requate
- 215: Representation of CII-Games and the expected contract value

- Joachim Rosenmüller
- 214: Zur Prominenzstruktur von Zahlenangaben bei diffuser numerischer Information. Ein Experiment mit kontrolliertem Grad der Diffusität

- Bodo Vogt and Wulf Albers
- 213: Star shapedness of the kernel for homogeneous games and application to weighted majority games

- Peter Sudhölter
- 212: Pollution control under imperfect competition via taxes or permits: Cournot Duopoly

- Till Requate
- 211: Incentives in market games with asymmetric information

- Beth Allen
- 210: Permits or taxes? How to regulate Cournot Duopoly with polluting firms

- Till Requate
- 209: The kernel of homogeneous games with steps

- Bezalel Peleg, Joachim Rosenmüller and Peter Sudhölter
- 208: Incentive compatible cost allocation schemes

- David Schmeidler and Yair Tauman
- 207: Linear representability without completeness and transitivity

- Walter Trockel
- 206: Central bank policy under strategic wage setting

- Volker Bieta
- 205: Robust implementation under alternative information structures

- Luis Corchon and Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín
- 204: Nash equilibria of informational extensions

- Nikolaj Serafimovič Kukuškin
- 203: On existence of stable and efficient outcomes in games with public and private objectives

- Nikolaj Serafimovič Kukuškin
- 202: The nucleolus of homogeneous games with steps

- Joachim Rosenmüller and Peter Sudhölter
- 201: Informationsverarbeitungsstrukturen in begrenzt rationalen komplexen individuellen Entscheidungen

- Andrea Brunwinkel
- 200: On the value of having the decision on the outcome of others

- Wulf Albers and Shmuel Zamir
- 199: Implementing demand equilibria as stable states of a revealed demand approach

- Wulf Albers and James D. Laing
- 198: Wage formation and credibility

- Volker Bieta and Martin Straub
- 197: An alternative proof for the linear utility representation theorem

- Walter Trockel
- 195: Directed and weighted majority games

- Ingomar Krohn and Peter Sudhölter
- 194: Dynamic Bertrand Edgeworth competition with entry, exit decisions

- Till Requate
- 193: The least core, nucleolus, and kernel of homogeneous weighted majority games

- Joachim Rosenmüller and Bezalel Peleg
- 192: Repeated Bertrand Edgeworth competition with increasing marginal costs

- Till Requate
- 191: Eine spieltheoretische Variante des Maximum-Prinzips

- Nikolaj N. Vorobʹev
- 190: Fee games: (N)TU-games with incomplete information

- Joachim Rosenmüller
- 189: Die Ausgestaltung von Geldpolitiken unter dem Einfluß eines Kontrollfehlers beim Geldangebotsprozeß der Zentralbank

- Volker Bieta
- 188: Sources of prominence in computer aided experimental spatial games

- Wulf Albers and James D. Laing
- 187: A bargaining problem with transferable utility

- Frank Weidner
- 186: Informationsstrukturen als Determinanten für den Erfolg von Geldpolitiken und die Bedeutung der Ausgestaltung der institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen in einer Ökonomie

- Volker Bieta
- 185: Domination, core and solution

- Olga Bondareva
- 184: Fusionen: ein einfaches Spiel als Beispiel sowie eine neue Charakterisierung des Banzhafwertes

- Axel Ostmann
- 183: Revealed fuzzy preferences

- Olga Bondareva
- 182: On optimal strategies in repeated zero-sum games with lack of information on one side

- Martin Heuer
- 181: Präferenzoffenbarung wirtschaftspolitischer Entscheidungsträger als Element der ¬Pollitikgestaltung [Politikgestaltung] im Kontext der asymmetrischen Information

- Volker Bieta
- 180: On the Harsanyi-Selten value

- Frank Weidner
- 179: Implementing the modified LH-algorithm

- Ingomar Krohn, S. Moltzahn, Joachim Rosenmüller, Peter Sudhölter and H.-M. Wallmeier
- 178: Wirtschaftspolitiken bei asymmetrischer Information als Resultat der "incentive" Struktur einer Politikinstanz, eine Steuerung der Ökonomie durch "pooling equilibria" oder "separating equilibria"

- Volker Bieta
- 177: A multi-person approach towards the maximization of the average rate of return

- Hans-Martin Wallmeier
- 176: The nucleolus of a game without side payments

- Olga Bondareva
- 175: Nash implementation with renegotiation in the case of two agents

- Detlev Homann
- 174: Asymptotically optimal strategies in repeated zero-sum games with incomplete information

- Martina Heuermann
- 173: Über Informationsprobleme bei der Implementation von Mechanismen

- Walter Trockel
- 172: Homogeneous games as anti step functions

- Peter Sudhölter
- 170: Incomplete contracts and Nash implementation in the case of two agents

- Detlev Homann