Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers

From Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University
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285: Cash equivalent versus market value

Wulf Albers

284: Evaluation of lotteries with two alternatives by the theory of prominence

Wulf Albers

283: Connection between ultimatum behavior and reciprocity in a combined ultimatum reciprocity game

Bodo Vogt

282: The price response function and logarithmic perception of prices and quantities

Fred Fegel, Bodo Vogt and Wulf Albers

281: Criteria for fair divisions in ultimatum games

Bodo Vogt

280: Stock price clustering and numerical perception

Andreas Uphaus, Bodo Vogt and Wulf Albers

279: The strength of reciprocity in a reciprocity game

Bodo Vogt

278: Reference functions and solutions to bargaining problems with claims

Anke Gerber

277: The averaging mechanism

Elisabeth Naeve-Steinweg

276: The Nash bargaining solution is Nash implementable

Jörg Naeve

275: On the value of discounted stochastic games

Jean-Michel Coulomb

274: Environmental taxation and the double dividend: a drawback for a revenue-neutral tax reform

Thorsten Bayındır-Upmann and Matthias G. Raith

273: An extension of the Raiffa Kalai Smorodinsky solution to bargaining problems with claims

Anke Gerber

272: Selection between pareto-optimal outcomes in 2-person bargaining

Bodo Vogt and Wulf Albers

271: Foundations of a theory of prominence in the decimal system. Part V: Operations on scales, and evaluation of prospects

Wulf Albers

270: Foundations of a theory of prominence in the decimal system. Part IV: Task dependence of smallest received money units, nonexistence of general utility functions, and related paradoxa

Wulf Albers

269: Foundations of a theory of prominence in the decimal system. Part III: Perception of numerical information, and relations to traditional solution concepts

Wulf Albers

268: The selection of mixed strategies in 2 x 2 bimatrix games

Wulf Albers and Bodo Vogt

267: Equilibrium selection in 2 x 2 bimatrix games with preplay communication

Bodo Vogt and Wulf Albers

266: Foundations of a theory of prominence in the decimal system. Part II: Exactness selection rule, and confirming results

Wulf Albers, Eike Albers, Leif Albers and Bodo Vogt

265: Foundations of a theory of prominence in the decimal system. Part I: Numerical response as a process, exactness, scales, and structure of scales

Wulf Albers

264: Coalition formation in general NTU games

Anke Gerber

263: Characterizations of two extended Walras solutions for open economies

Bernd Korthues

262: Nucleoli as maximizers of collective satisfaction functions

Peter Sudhölter and Bezalel Peleg

261: An improvement on the existence proof of joint plan equilibria

Robert Samuel Simon

260: The difference between common knowledge of formulas and sets: Part II

Robert Samuel Simon

259: The welfare implications of an ecological tax reform under monopoly

Thorsten Bayındır-Upmann

258: A note on existence of equilibria in generalized economies

Bezalel Peleg

257: The canonical extensive form of a game form. Part II - Representation

Peter Sudhölter and Joachim Rosenmüller

256: Consistency and its convers: an approach for economies

Bernd Korthues

255: The existence of Nash equilibria in two-person, infinitely repeated undiscounted games of incomplete information

Robert Samuel Simon

254: Partial equilibrium in pure exchange economies

Bezalel Peleg

253: The canonical extensive form of a game form. Part I - Symmetries

Bezalel Peleg, Joachim Rosenmüller and Peter Sudhölter

252: The difference between common knowledge of formulas and sets: Part I

Robert Samuel Simon

251: A further extension of the KKMS theorem

Yakar Kannai and Myrna Wooders

250: Axiomatizations of game theoretical solutions for one-output cost sharing problems

Peter Sudhölter

249: Two games of interjurisdictional competition where local governments provide industrial public goods

Thorsten Bayindir-Upmann

248: Separable aggregation and the existence of Nash equilibrium

Nikolai Kukushkin

247: A formal approach to Nash's program

Bezalel Peleg

246: Airport problems and consistent solution rules

Jos Potters and Peter Sudhölter

245: An exact implementation of the Nash bargaining solution in dominant strategies

Walter Trockel

244: The Nash solution as a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function on bargaining games

Anke Gerber

243: Pigouvian taxes may fail even in a perfect world

Till Requate

242: Alienated extensions and common knowledge worlds

Robert Samuel Simon

241: Existence of generalized Walras equilibria for generalized economies

Bernd Korthues

240: The Shapley value for countably many players

Diethard Pallaschke and Joachim Rosenmüller

239: Interjurisdictional competition in emission taxes under imperfect competition of local firms

Thorsten Upmann

238: Interjurisdictional tax competition, provision of two local public goods, and environmental policy

Thorsten Upmann

237: Conservation of energy in nonatomic games

Michael Ortmann

236: Preservation of differences, potential, conservity

Michael Ortmann