Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers

From Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University
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263: Characterizations of two extended Walras solutions for open economies

Bernd Korthues

262: Nucleoli as maximizers of collective satisfaction functions

Peter Sudhölter and Bezalel Peleg

261: An improvement on the existence proof of joint plan equilibria

Robert Samuel Simon

260: The difference between common knowledge of formulas and sets: Part II

Robert Samuel Simon

259: The welfare implications of an ecological tax reform under monopoly

Thorsten Bayındır-Upmann

258: A note on existence of equilibria in generalized economies

Bezalel Peleg

257: The canonical extensive form of a game form. Part II - Representation

Peter Sudhölter and Joachim Rosenmüller

256: Consistency and its convers: an approach for economies

Bernd Korthues

255: The existence of Nash equilibria in two-person, infinitely repeated undiscounted games of incomplete information

Robert Samuel Simon

254: Partial equilibrium in pure exchange economies

Bezalel Peleg

253: The canonical extensive form of a game form. Part I - Symmetries

Bezalel Peleg, Joachim Rosenmüller and Peter Sudhölter

252: The difference between common knowledge of formulas and sets: Part I

Robert Samuel Simon

251: A further extension of the KKMS theorem

Yakar Kannai and Myrna Wooders

250: Axiomatizations of game theoretical solutions for one-output cost sharing problems

Peter Sudhölter

249: Two games of interjurisdictional competition where local governments provide industrial public goods

Thorsten Bayindir-Upmann

248: Separable aggregation and the existence of Nash equilibrium

Nikolai Kukushkin

247: A formal approach to Nash's program

Bezalel Peleg

246: Airport problems and consistent solution rules

Jos Potters and Peter Sudhölter

245: An exact implementation of the Nash bargaining solution in dominant strategies

Walter Trockel

244: The Nash solution as a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function on bargaining games

Anke Gerber

243: Pigouvian taxes may fail even in a perfect world

Till Requate

242: Alienated extensions and common knowledge worlds

Robert Samuel Simon

241: Existence of generalized Walras equilibria for generalized economies

Bernd Korthues

240: The Shapley value for countably many players

Diethard Pallaschke and Joachim Rosenmüller

239: Interjurisdictional competition in emission taxes under imperfect competition of local firms

Thorsten Upmann

238: Interjurisdictional tax competition, provision of two local public goods, and environmental policy

Thorsten Upmann

237: Conservation of energy in nonatomic games

Michael Ortmann

236: Preservation of differences, potential, conservity

Michael Ortmann

235: On the existence of equilibrium in hierarchically structured economies

Willy Spanjers

234: Green taxes in oligopoly revisited: exogenous versus endogenous number of firms

Till Requate

233: Excessive and under-investment: on the incentives to adopt new technologies under Pigouvian taxes and tradeable permits

Till Requate

232: Solution concepts for c-convex, assignment, and m2-games

Peter Sudhölter

231: A Walrasian approach to bargaining games

Walter Trockel

230: An axiomatisation of Nash equilibria in economic situations

Bezalel Peleg and Peter Sudhölter

229: Endogenous structures of trade relationships in hierarchically structured economies with bid and ask prices and two commodities

Willy Spanjers

228: Bargaining with incomplete information: an axiomatic approach

Joachim Rosenmüller

227: Concave utility and individual demand

Yakar Kannai

226: Arbitrage and monopolistic market structures

Willy Spanjers

225: Bid and ask prices in hierarchically structured economies with two commodities

Willy Spanjers

224: Arbitrage and Walrasian equilibrium in hierarchically structured economies

Willy Spanjers

223: Population and environmental quality

Mark B. Cronshaw and Till Requate

222: Incentives to innovate under emission taxes and tradeable permits

Till Requate

221: Entwurf zur Verbesserung der Lenkungseffizienz der Selbstbeteiligung in der GKV am Beispiel Zahnersatz. Der Proportionaltarif mit differenziertem Selbstbehalt

Walter Winkler

220: Independence for characterizing axioms of the pre-nucleolus

Peter Sudhölter

219: Equivalence of effluent taxes and permits for environmental regulation of several local monopolies

Till Requate

218: A mathematical note on the structure of SYMLOG directions

Dieter Betten and Axel Ostmann

217: Incentives in market games with asymmetric information: approximate (NTU) cores in large economies

Beth Allen

216: Pollution control under imperfect competition: asymmetric Bertrand oligopoly with linear technologies

Till Requate

215: Representation of CII-Games and the expected contract value

Joachim Rosenmüller

214: Zur Prominenzstruktur von Zahlenangaben bei diffuser numerischer Information. Ein Experiment mit kontrolliertem Grad der Diffusität

Bodo Vogt and Wulf Albers