Observable Implications of Nash and Subgame-Perfect Behavior in Extensive Games
Indrajit Ray () and
Susan Snyder ()
No 04-14, Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of Birmingham
We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for observed outcomes in extensive game forms, in which preferences are unobserved, to be rationalized first, weakly, as a Nash equilibrium and then, fully, as the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Thus, one could use these conditions to find that play is (a) consistent with subgame-perfect equilibrium, or (b) not consistent with subgame-perfect behavior but is consistent with Nash equilibrium, or (c) consistent with neither.
Keywords: Revealed Preference; Consistency; Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
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Journal Article: Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games (2013)
Working Paper: Observable Implications of Nash and Subgame- Perfect Behavior in Extensive Games (2013)
Working Paper: Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bir:birmec:04-14
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