Observable Implications of Nash and Subgame-Perfect Behavior in Extensive Games

Indrajit Ray (rayi1@cardiff.ac.uk) and Susan Snyder (sksnyder@stanfordalumni.org)

No 04-14, Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of Birmingham

Abstract: We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for observed outcomes in extensive game forms, in which preferences are unobserved, to be rationalized first, weakly, as a Nash equilibrium and then, fully, as the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Thus, one could use these conditions to find that play is (a) consistent with subgame-perfect equilibrium, or (b) not consistent with subgame-perfect behavior but is consistent with Nash equilibrium, or (c) consistent with neither.

Keywords: Revealed Preference; Consistency; Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2004-06, Revised 2013-04
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://repec.cal.bham.ac.uk/pdf/04-14.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games (2013)
Working Paper: Observable Implications of Nash and Subgame- Perfect Behavior in Extensive Games (2013)
Working Paper: Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bir:birmec:04-14

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of Birmingham Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oleksandr Talavera (o.talavera@bham.ac.uk).