EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Observable Implications of Nash and Subgame-Perfect Behavior in Extensive Games

Indrajit Ray () and Susan Snyder ()

No 04-14, Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of Birmingham

Abstract: We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for observed outcomes in extensive game forms, in which preferences are unobserved, to be rationalized first, weakly, as a Nash equilibrium and then, fully, as the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Thus, one could use these conditions to find that play is (a) consistent with subgame-perfect equilibrium, or (b) not consistent with subgame-perfect behavior but is consistent with Nash equilibrium, or (c) consistent with neither.

Keywords: Revealed Preference; Consistency; Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2013-04
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://repec.cal.bham.ac.uk/pdf/04-14.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Observable Implications of Nash and Subgame- Perfect Behavior in Extensive Games (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games (2004) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bir:birmec:04-14

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of Birmingham Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oleksandr Talavera ().

 
Page updated 2022-09-30
Handle: RePEc:bir:birmec:04-14