Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games

Susan Snyder (sksnyder@stanfordalumni.org) and Indrajit Ray (rayi1@cardiff.ac.uk)

No 407, Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings from Econometric Society

Abstract: We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for observed outcomes in extensive game forms, in which preferences are unobserved, to be rationalized first, partially, as a Nash equilibrium and then, fully, as the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Thus, one could use these conditions to find that play is (a) consistent with subgame-perfect equilibrium, or (b) not consistent with subgame-perfect equilibrium but is consistent with Nash equilibrium, or (c) consistent with neither.

Keywords: Revealed preference; subgame-perfect equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-08-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games (2013)
Working Paper: Observable Implications of Nash and Subgame-Perfect Behavior in Extensive Games (2013)
Working Paper: Observable Implications of Nash and Subgame- Perfect Behavior in Extensive Games (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:nasm04:407

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