Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games
Indrajit Ray () and
Susan Snyder ()
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2013, vol. 49, issue 6, 471-477
We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for observed outcomes in extensive game forms, in which preferences are unobserved, to be rationalized first, weakly, as a Nash equilibrium and then as the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Thus, one could use these conditions to find that play is (a) consistent with subgame-perfect equilibrium, or (b) not consistent with subgame-perfect behavior but is consistent with Nash equilibrium, or (c) consistent with neither.
Keywords: Revealed preference; Consistency; Subgame-perfect equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Observable Implications of Nash and Subgame-Perfect Behavior in Extensive Games (2013)
Working Paper: Observable Implications of Nash and Subgame- Perfect Behavior in Extensive Games (2013)
Working Paper: Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:49:y:2013:i:6:p:471-477
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