The Effect of Rewards and Sanctions in Provision of Public Goods
Robert Shupp and
James Walker ()
Additional contact information
James Walker: Department of Economics, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: James Marvin Walker and
James R. Walker
No 200504, Working Papers from Ball State University, Department of Economics
A growing number of field and experimental studies in social dilemma settings focus on the institutional arrangements by which individuals are able to solve collective action problems. Important in this research is the role of reciprocity and institutions that facilitate cooperation via opportunities for monitoring, sanctioning, and rewarding others. This study contrasts sanction and reward institutions in the context of a public goods experiment. Sanctions represent a net loss, a cost to both the participant imposing the sanction and the individual receiving the sanction. Rewards represent a zero sum transfer from participants giving rewards to those receiving rewards. These institutions are compared in regard to their impact on overall levels of cooperation and economic efficiency.
JEL-codes: C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2005-02, Revised 2005-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-pbe and nep-pol
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http://econfac.bsu.edu/research/workingpapers/bsuecwp200504sefton.pdf First version, 2005 (application/pdf)
Journal Article: THE EFFECT OF REWARDS AND SANCTIONS IN PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS (2007)
Working Paper: The Effect of Rewards and Sanctions in Provision of Public Goods (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bsu:wpaper:200504
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