The Effect of Rewards and Sanctions in Provision of Public Goods

Martin Sefton, Robert Shupp and James Walker

No 2006-005, CAEPR Working Papers from Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington

Abstract: A growing number of field and experimental studies focus on the institutional arrangements by which individuals are able to solve collective action problems. Important in this research is the role of reciprocity and institutions that facilitate cooperation via opportunities for monitoring, sanctioning, and rewarding others. Sanctions represent a cost to both the participant imposing the sanction and the individual receiving the sanction. Rewards represent a zero sum transfer from participants giving to those receiving rewards. We contrast reward and sanction institutions in regard to their impact on cooperation and efficiency in the context of a public goods experiment.

Pages: 43 pages
Date: 2006-07, Revised 2006-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-knm, nep-pbe and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (60)

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Related works:
Journal Article: THE EFFECT OF REWARDS AND SANCTIONS IN PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS (2007)
Working Paper: The Effect of Rewards and Sanctions in Provision of Public Goods (2005)
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