Brothers in alms? coordination between nonprofits on markets for donations

Gani Aldashev, Marco Marini and Thierry Verdier

No 293, Carlo Alberto Notebooks from Collegio Carlo Alberto

Abstract: Mission-driven nonprofi?t organizations compete for donations through fundrais- ing activities. Such competition can lead to inefficient outcomes, if nonpro?fits impose ex- ternalities on each others? output. This paper studies the design of sustainable voluntary cooperation agreements, using a game-theoretic model of alliance formation. Two key char- acteristics determine the stability of cooperation: the alliance formation rule and whether the fundraising efforts of nonprofi?ts are strategic complements or substitutes. Both affect the incentives to deviate from the cooperative agreement (by one or several nonpro?ts). We propose conditions on the alliance formation protocols that facilitate the stability of Pareto-optimal cooperation in fundraising.

Keywords: nonprofits; giving; coordination; endogenous coalition formation; non-distribution constraint. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D74 L31 L44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
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Related works:
Journal Article: Brothers in alms? Coordination between nonprofits on markets for donations (2014)
Working Paper: Brothers in alms ? Coordination between nonprofits on markets for donations (2014)
Working Paper: Brothers in alms? Coordination between nonprofits on markets for donations (2014)
Working Paper: Brothers in alms? Coordination between nonprofits on markets for donations (2014)
Working Paper: Brothers in Alms? Coordination Betwen Nonprofits on Markets for Donations (2014)
Working Paper: Brothers in Alms? Coordination between NGOs on Markets for Development Donations (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cca:wpaper:293

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