Brothers in alms? Coordination between nonprofits on markets for donations

Gani Aldashev, Marco Marini and Thierry Verdier

PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL

Abstract: Mission-driven nonprofit organizations compete for donations through fundraising activities. Such competition can lead to inefficient outcomes, if nonprofits impose externalities on each others' output. This paper studies the sustainability of fundraising coordination agreements, using a game-theoretic model of coalition formation. We show that three key characteristics determine the stability of cooperation between nonprofits: (i) the alliance formation rule, (ii) the extent to which fundraising efforts are strategic complements/substitutes, and (iii) whether deviation from the agreements is by an individual or by a group of nonprofits. We analyze how the interaction of these three features induces (or not) the stability of Pareto-optimal full coordination in fundraising.

Keywords: Endogenous coalition formation; Non-distribution constraint; Coordination; Charitable giving; Nonprofits (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

Published in Journal of Public Economics, 2014, 117, pp.182-200. ⟨10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.04.009⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Brothers in alms? Coordination between nonprofits on markets for donations (2014)
Working Paper: Brothers in alms ? Coordination between nonprofits on markets for donations (2014)
Working Paper: Brothers in alms? Coordination between nonprofits on markets for donations (2014)
Working Paper: Brothers in Alms? Coordination Betwen Nonprofits on Markets for Donations (2014)
Working Paper: Brothers in alms? coordination between nonprofits on markets for donations (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-01109513

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.04.009

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