Brothers in Alms? Coordination Betwen Nonprofits on Markets for Donations

Gani Aldashev, Marco Marini and Thierry Verdier

No 1406, Working Papers from University of Namur, Department of Economics

Abstract: Mission-driven nonprofit organizations compete for donations through fundraising activities. Such competition can lead to inefficient outcomes, if nonprofits impose externalities on each others' output. This paper studies the sustainability of fundraising coordination agreements, using a game-theoretic model of coalition formation. Three key characteristics determine the stability of cooperation: (i) the alliance formation rule, (ii) the extent to which fundraising efforts are strategic complements/substitutes, and (iii) whether deviation from the agreements is by an individual or by a group of nonprots. We also characterize necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the stability of Pareto-optimal full coordination in fundraising.

Keywords: nonprofits; charitable giving; coordination; endogenous coalition formation; non-distribution constraint (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D74 L31 L44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2014-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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http://www.fundp.ac.be/eco/economie/recherche/wpseries/wp/1406.pdf First version, 2014 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Brothers in alms? Coordination between nonprofits on markets for donations (2014)
Working Paper: Brothers in alms ? Coordination between nonprofits on markets for donations (2014)
Working Paper: Brothers in alms? Coordination between nonprofits on markets for donations (2014)
Working Paper: Brothers in alms? Coordination between nonprofits on markets for donations (2014)
Working Paper: Brothers in alms? coordination between nonprofits on markets for donations (2013)
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