Cheap Talk in Bargaining Games

Joseph Farrell () and Robert Gibbons

Department of Economics, Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley

Keywords: cheap talk; communication; bargaining; mechanism design; game theory; Social and Behavioral Sciences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1986-12-23
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