Migration-Regime Liberalization and Social Security: Political-Economy Effect

Assaf Razin and Edith Sand ()

No 2653, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: The pay-as-you-go social security system, which suffers from dwindling labor force, can benefit from immigrants with birth rates that exceed the native-born birth rates in the host country. Thus, a social security system provides effectively an incentive to liberalize migration policy. The paper examines a political- economy, inter-generational, mechanism through which the social security system influences voter attitudes in favor of more liberal immigration regime. We demonstrate that the Markov equilibrium, with social security, consists of more liberal migration policies, than the corresponding Markov equilibrium with no social security.

JEL-codes: F22 H55 J11 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Migration-Regime Liberalization and Social Security: Political-Economy Effect (2009)
Working Paper: Migration-Regime Liberalization and Social Security: Political-Economy Effect (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2653

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