Migration-Regime Liberalization and Social Security: Political-Economy Effect

Assaf Razin and Edith Sand ()

No 7310, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: The pay-as-you-go social security system, burdened by dwindling labour force, can benefit from immigrants, with birth rates that exceed the native-born birth rates. Thus, the social security system effectively provides an incentive to liberalize migration policy through a political-economy mechanism. The paper examines a dynamic political-economy mechanism through which the social security system influences the young decisive voter's attitudes in favour of a more liberal immigration regime. A Markov equilibrium with social security consists of a more liberal migration policy, than a corresponding equilibrium with no social security.

Keywords: Demographic imbalance; Pay-as-you-go social security system; Repeated voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F22 H55 J11 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Migration-Regime Liberalization and Social Security: Political-Economy Effect (2009)
Working Paper: Migration-Regime Liberalization and Social Security: Political-Economy Effect (2009)
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