Migration-Regime Liberalization and Social Security: Political-Economy Effect

Assaf Razin and Edith Sand ()

No 15013, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The pay-as-you-go social security system, increasingly burdened by dwindling labor force, can benefit from immigrants whose birth rates exceed those of the native born birth. The paper examines adynamic political-economy mechanism through which the social security system influences the young decisive voter's attitudes in favor of a more liberal immigration regime. A Markov equilibrium with social security consists of a more liberal migration policy, than a corresponding equilibrium with no social security. Thus, the social security system effectively provides an incentive to liberalize migration policy through a political-economy mechanism.

JEL-codes: F2 H0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mig and nep-pol
Note: IFM PE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Migration-Regime Liberalization and Social Security: Political-Economy Effect (2009)
Working Paper: Migration-Regime Liberalization and Social Security: Political-Economy Effect (2009)
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